Wednesday, March 31, 2021

Stamp Duty need to be paid on Sale Agreement


In the light of Article 5(e)(i) of the Karnataka Stamp Act, Sale Agreement and subsequent delivery of possession can be regarded as a conveyance as the instrument in question is covered by Article 5(e)(i) for which the proper duty payable under the Karnataka Stamp Act is the same duty as a conveyance (No. 20) on the market value of the property. In the instant case, the proper stamp duty payable under the Karnataka Stamp Act being not paid and when the document was sought to be used in evidence, the Court below was justified in not allowing it.


Karnataka High Court

Jayalakshmi Reddy

vs

Thippanna And Ors.

on 30 August, 2002

Equivalent citations: ILR 2002 KAR 5163, 2003 (5) KarLJ 263

Author: B Padmaraj

Bench: B Padmaraj

ORDER B. Padmaraj, J.

1. Heard the arguments of the learned Counsel for the petitioner and carefully perused the case papers including the impugned order made by the Court below.

2. By the impugned order, the Court below has directed the petitioner herein to pay the deficit stamp duty of Rs. 1,450/- with penalty of Rs. 14,500/- for the sale agreement dated 4-11-1995 being admitted in evidence.

3. The petitioner herein is the plaintiff before the Trial Court. The suit of the petitioner-plaintiff is for the relief of specific performance on the basis of a sale agreement dated 4-11-1995 and also for the consequential relief of permanent injunction. The respondents/defendants has denied the execution of the agreement of sale in favour of the petitioner herein. During the course of the trial, when the petitioner herein was examined as P.W. 1 and wanted to mark the sale agreement in the evidence, the other side objected for the marking of the said agreement on the ground that it is unregistered and as also the same is not duly stamped. The Trial Court has upheld the objection of the respondents and passed the impugned order which reads as under:

"6. Point No. 1.--The suit schedule properties are (1) Sy. No. 59 measuring 12 guntas; (2) Sy. No. 60/1 measuring 7 guntas; (3) Sy. No. 58 measuring 17 guntas, all are wetland and bagaith land.

7. The plaintiff has filed this suit against the defendants for specific performance of contract. Suit is based on unregistered sale agreement dated 4-11-1995. The 2nd and 3rd defendants are subsequent purchasers of the suit schedule properties item Nos. 1 and 2 from the first defendant through registered sale deed dated 16-12-1998.

8. I have perused the sale agreement dated 4-11-1995. It shows that the first defendant-Thippanna has executed the sale agreement in respect of suit schedule properties for consideration of Rs. 15,000-00 and received the amount of Rs. 14,500-00. The evidence of plaintiff and sale agreement shows that, on the date of sale agreement itself, the first defendant has delivered the possession of the suit schedule properties to the plaintiff. The sale agreement written on the stamp paper of Rs. 50-00.

9. The sale agreement comes into existence after the Karnataka Stamp Act amended and came into force on 1-4-1995.

10. Article 5(e)(i) of the Schedule of Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957 states that possession of the property is delivered or is agreed to be delivered without executing the conveyance, the proper stamp duty is the same duty as a conveyance (No. 20) on the market value of the property.

11. Article 20 of the said Schedule states that, the value of conveyance exceeds Rs. 900-00, but does not exceed Rs. 1,000-00, the proper stamp duty is Rs. 100-00 and for every Rs. 500-00 or part thereof to in excess of Rs. 1,000-00, the proper stamp duty is Rs. 50-00.

It is relevant to state that the proper stamp duty is Rs. 100-00 for every Rs. 1,000-00,

12. Section 2(d) of the said Act defines conveyance as follows:

"(d) "Conveyance" includes a conveyance on sale and every instrument by which property, whether moveable or immovable is transferred inter vivos and which is not otherwise specifically provided for by the Schedule".

Section 34 of the said Act states as follows.-

"34. Instruments not duly stamped inadmissible in evidence, etc.--No instrument chargeable with duty shall be admitted in evidence for any purpose by any person having by law or consent of parties authority to receive evidence, or shall be acted upon, registered or authenticated by any such person or by any public officer, unless such instrument is duly stamped:

Provided that-

(a) any such instrument not being an instrument chargeable with a duty not exceeding fifteen paise only, or a mortgage of crop Article 35(a) of the Schedule chargeable under Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 3 with a duty of twenty-five paise shall, subject to all just exceptions, be admitted in evidence on payment of the duty with which the same is chargeable, or, in the case of an instrument insufficiently stamped, of the amount required to make up such duty, together with a penalty of five rupees, or, when ten times the amount of the proper duty or deficient portion thereof exceeds five rupees, of a sum equal to ten times such duty or portion;

(b) where a contract or agreement of any kind is effected by correspondence consisting of two or more letters and any one of the letters bears the proper stamp, the contract or agreement shall be deemed to be duly stamped;

  (c) xxxx xxxx          xxxx; 
  (d) xxxx xxxx          xxxx".
 

13. The suit schedule properties are immovable properties, and the possession delivered to the plaintiff by virtue of alleged agreement. The sale consideration is Rs. 15,000-00. The proper stamp duty is Rs. 1,500-00, but the sale agreement written on the stamp paper of Rs. 50-00. The deficit stamp duty is Rs. 1,450-00. Under proviso (a) of Section 34 of the said Act, alleged agreement can be admitted in evidence if the deficit stamp duty of Rs. 1,450-00 paid with penalty of Rs. 14,500-00 i.e., 10 times of Rs. 1,450-00. Hence, I answer point No. 1 accordingly".

4. While assailing the impugned order made by the Trial Court, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has vehemently contended before me that the agreement of sale will only create contractual rights and obligations between the parties and it does not create any absolute right or interest in the immovable properties. He contended that under an agreement of sale, the title in respect of the immovable property is not transferred and hence, it does not amount to a conveyance. He also contended that a contract may be expressed or implied and if it is expressed i.e., in writing and not duly stamped, it can be admitted in evidence for establishing the contractual relationship of vendor and vendee between the parties, just like in the case of an unregistered lease deed etc. He also contended that the explanation to Clauses (e) to (h) of Article 5 of the Schedule gives an option to a party who has obtained an agreement of sale to pay the stamp duty even at the time of the sale deed and that in any event, there will be no loss of revenue to the State and hence, the stamp duty could be collected even at the time of the registration of the document of sale instead of insisting upon such stamp duty at the time of the agreement of sale. He also contended that even in the event of the suit being decreed, the petitioner will have to seek for the registration of the sale deed and in that event also, he will be required to pay the stamp duty. He therefore, contended that the Trial Court was not justified in passing the impugned order.

5. It is not in dispute that the suit agreement of sale has been executed after the Karnataka Stamp Act has been amended by Act No. 8 of 1995 with effect from 1-4-1995. To be more precise, the suit agreement is dated 4-11-1995 whereas, Clauses (e) to (i) under Article 5 came to be substituted by Act No. 8 of 1995 with effect from 1-4-1995. Hence, there could be no dispute that the said amended provisions of the Karnataka Stamp Act are clearly attracted to the document in question. Article 5(e) of the Karnataka Stamp Act prescribes, that agreement or its records or memorandum of agreement, if relating to sale of immovable property, wherein part performance of the contract, possession of the property is delivered or is agreed to be delivered without executing the conveyance, then, the stamp duty payable is the same as conveyance (No. 20) on the market value of the property. The explanation to Article 5(e) to (i) prescribes that for the purpose of Sub-clause (i) of Clause (e) and Clause (h), where subsequently conveyance or mortgage as the case may be, is executed in pursuance of such agreement or its records or memorandum, the stamp duty, if any, already paid and recovered on the agreement or its record or memorandum shall be adjusted towards the total duty leviable on the conveyance or mortgage, as the case may be. Thus, it is clear that where an agreement of sale under which the possession is delivered, it amounts to conveyance and hence, attracts stamp duty as conveyance (No. 20) on the market value of the property. That is to say the stamp duty in respect of such an agreement covered by Article 5(e) is leviable as if it is a conveyance. The conditions to be fulfilled are: if there is an agreement of sale of immovable property where in part performance of contract possession of such property is delivered to the purchaser or is agreed to be delivered without executing the conveyance in respect thereof, such an agreement of sale is deemed to be a conveyance. In the event, a conveyance is executed in pursuance of such an agreement subsequently, the stamp duty already paid and recovered on the agreement of sale which is deemed to be a conveyance shall be adjusted towards the total duty leviable on the conveyance. In the instant case, the agreement entered into between the parties, which is a basic document for claiming the relief of specific performance and for injunction, clearly provides for sale of immovable property and it also recites that the possession has been delivered. Therefore, the document in question clearly falls within the scope of Article 6(e) of the Karnataka Stamp Act and its Explanation (II). It is open to the Legislature to levy duty on different kinds of agreements at different rates. If the Legislature thought that it would be appropriate to collect duty at the stage of the agreement itself, if it fulfills certain conditions instead of postponing collection of such duty till the completion of the transaction by execution of a conveyance deed inasmuch as all substantial conditions of a conveyance have already been fulfilled, such as an agreement if relating to sale of immovable property, where, in part performance possession of the property is delivered and what remains to be done is a mere formality of paying the balance and of execution of sale deed, it would be necessary to collect duty at a later stage itself though right, title and interest may not have passed as such. Still by reason of the fact that under the terms of the agreement there is an intention of sale and possession of the property has also been delivered, it is certainly open to the State to charge such instruments at a particular rate, which is same as a conveyance on the market value of the property, and that is exactly what has been done in the present case. Therefore, it cannot be said that the impugned order made by the Trial Court suffers from any such illegality or material irregularity so as to call for interference in revision. No doubt, it was sought to be argued by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the said document though insufficiently stamped, may be admitted for collateral purpose. But, I am afraid that the document, which is insufficiently stamped, cannot be permitted to be used for collateral purpose in view of Section 34 of the Karnataka Stamp Act which clearly prescribes that no instrument chargeable with duty shall be admitted in evidence for any purpose. The instrument in question is an agreement of sale dated 4-11-1995 between the parties viz., the vendor and vendee, whereunder the vendor agreed to sell his immovable property for a consideration of Rs. 15,000/- and received thereunder a sum of Rs. 14,500/- and where in part performance of the contract, possession of the immovable property is delivered. Thus, the instrument in question fully satisfies the conditions of Article 5(e)(i) and hence, the stamp duty payable on conveyance is to be demanded and paid in view of the said Article 5(e)(i). The instrument covered by Article 5(e)(i) is treated as a conveyance and the proper stamp duty payable thereon is the same as a conveyance (No. 20) on the market value of the property and the Expla7 nation (II) only says that where subsequently, conveyance is executed, the stamp duty already paid or recovered on the agreement shall be adjusted and it does not in any way gives an option to the party to pay the stamp duty subsequently. On the other hand Article 5(e)(i) clearly indicates that the proper duty is to be paid at the stage of agreement itself if it satisfies the conditions thereof. Having considered the agreement as a whole in the light of Article 5(e)(i) of the Karnataka Stamp Act, I am of the view that it can be regarded as a conveyance as the instrument in question is covered by Article 5(e)(i) for which the proper duty payable under the Karnataka Stamp Act is the same duty as a conveyance (No. 20) on the market value of the property. In the instant case, the proper stamp duty payable under the Karnataka Stamp Act being not paid and when the document was sought to be used in evidence, the Court below was justified in passing the impugned order which cannot be found fault with. Hence, it needs no interference.

6. Therefore, having given my anxious consideration to the entire matter in issue, I am of the view that this revision petition filed by the petitioner is liable to be dismissed in limine and it is accordingly dismissed at the stage of admission itself.



Thursday, March 18, 2021

Documents filed to be considered under Order VII Rule 11

 

While considering Rejection of Plaint the court has to go through the Plaint and documents filed.

The Plaintiff have to discharge the onus of proof that the suit was filed within the period of limitation  If not the Plaint is liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 (d) of CPC.

  

 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9519 OF 2019
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.11618 of 2017)


           DAHIBEN                                                   … Appellant
                                                 versus

           ARVINDBHAI KALYANJI BHANUSALI
           (GAJRA)(D) THR LRS & ORS.                … Respondents


                                            JUDGMENT

INDU MALHOTRA, J.

1. The present Civil Appeal has been filed to challenge the impugned Judgment and Order dated 19.10.2016 passed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court, which affirmed the Order of the Trial Court, allowing the application filed by Defendant Nos. 2 and 3/Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 herein under Order VII Rule 11(d), CPC holding that the suit filed by the Appellant and Respondent Nos. 9 to 13 herein (hereinafter referred to as the “Plaintiffs”) was barred by limitation.

2. The subject-matter of the present proceedings pertains to a ARJUN BISHT plot of agricultural land of old tenure, admeasuring approximately 8701 sq. mtrs. in Revenue Survey No. 610, Block No.573 situated in village Mota Varachha, Sub-District Surat (hereinafter referred to as the “suit property”) which was in the ownership of the Plaintiffs.

3. The land was under restrictive tenure as per Section 73AA of the Land Revenue Code. The Plaintiffs filed an application dated 13.05.2008 before the Collector, Surat to obtain permission for selling the suit property to Respondent No.1/Defendant No.1, which was non-irrigated, and stated that they had no objection to the sale of the suit property.

4. The Collector vide Order dated 19.06.2009, after carrying out verification of the title of the Plaintiffs, permitted sale of the suit property, and fixed the sale price of the suit property as per the jantri issued by the State Government @ Rs. 2000/- per sq. mtr., which would work out to Rs. 1,74,02,000/-. The Collector granted permission for the sale subject to the terms and conditions contained in Section 73AA of the Land Revenue Code. It was stipulated that the purchaser shall make the payment by cheque, and reference of the payment shall be made in the Sale Deed.

5. After obtaining permission from the Collector, the Plaintiffs sold the suit property to Respondent No.1 herein vide registered Sale Deed

dated 02.07.2009. Respondent No. 1 - purchaser issued 36 cheques for Rs.1,74,02,000 towards payment of the sale consideration in favour of the Plaintiffs, the details of which were set out in the registered Sale Deed dated 02.07.2009.

6. The Respondent No. 1 subsequently sold the suit property to Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 herein vide registered Sale Deed dated 01.04.2013, for a sale consideration of Rs. 2,01,00,000/-.

7. On 15.12.2014, the Plaintiffs filed Special Civil Suit No. 718/2014 before the Principal Civil Judge, Surat against the original purchaser i.e. Respondent No. 1, and also impleaded the subsequent purchasers i.e. Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 as defendants. It was inter alia prayed that the Sale Deed dated 02.07.2009 be cancelled and declared as being illegal, void, ineffective and not binding on them, on the ground that the sale consideration fixed by the Collector, had not been paid in entirety by Respondent No. 1.

The Plaintiffs contended that they were totally illiterate, and were not able to read and write, and were only able to put their thumb impression on the Sale Deed dated 02.07.2009. The Sale Deed was obtained without payment of full consideration. The Respondent No.1 had paid only Rs.40,000 through 6 cheques, and remaining 30 cheques for Rs.1,73,62,000 were “bogus” cheques. The Plaintiffs prayed for cancellation of the Sale Deed dated 02.07.2009, and also prayed that the subsequent Sale Deed dated 01.04.2013 be declared as illegal, void and ineffective; and, the physical possession of the suit property be restored to the Plaintiffs.

8. Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 filed an Application for Rejection of the Plaint under Order VII Rule 11 (a) and (d) of the CPC, contending that the suit filed by the Plaintiffs was barred by limitation, and that no cause of action had been disclosed in the plaint. It was inter alia submitted that the Plaintiffs had admitted the execution of the Sale Deed dated 02.07.2009 in favour of Respondent No.1 before the Sub-Registrar, Surat. The only dispute now sought to be raised was that they had not received a part of the sale consideration. This plea was denied as being incorrect.

It was further submitted that if the Sale Deed dated 02.07.2009 was being challenged, then the suit ought to have been filed within three years i.e. on or before 02.07.2012. It was further submitted that pursuant to the execution of the registered Sale Deed dated 02.07.2009, the Plaintiffs had participated in the proceedings before the Revenue Officer for transfer of the suit property in the revenue records in favour of Respondent No.1. On that basis, the suit property had been transferred to Respondent No.1 vide Hakk Patrak Entry No. 6517 dated 24.07.2009. Before certifying the said entry, notice under Section 135D of the Land Revenue Code had been duly served on the Plaintiffs, and ever since, Respondent No. 1 had been paying the land revenue on the suit property, and taking the produce therefrom.

Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 further submitted that they had purchased the suit property from Respondent No.1 after verifying the title, and inspecting the revenue records. The Respondent No.1 had sold the suit property vide a registered Sale Deed dated 01.04.2013, on payment of valuable consideration of Rs. 2,01,00,000/-. Pursuant thereto, the suit property was transferred in the name of Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 in the revenue records.

It was further submitted that the Plaintiffs, with a view to mislead the Court, had deliberately filed copies of the 7/12 extracts dated 20.07.2009, which was prior to the mutation being effected in the name of Respondent No.1. It was submitted that the suit was devoid of any merit, and clearly time-barred, and liable to be rejected.

9. The Trial Court carried out a detailed analysis of the averments in the plaint alongwith the documents filed with the plaint, including the registered Sale Deed dated 02.07.2009, executed by the Plaintiffs. The undisputed facts which emerged from the averments in the plaint was that the suit property was of restrictive tenure under Section 73AA of the Land Revenue Code. Since the Plaintiffs were in dire need of money, and wanted to sell the suit property to Respondent No. 1, they had filed an application before the Collector, Surat on 13.05.2008 to obtain permission for sale of the suit property. The Collector vide Order dated 19.06.2009 granted permission to the Plaintiffs and fixed the sale price at Rs. 1,74,02,000/- which was to be paid through cheques. It was contended in the plaint that the Respondent No. 1 had in fact paid only Rs. 40,000/-, and false cheques of Rs. 1,73,62,000/- were issued, which remained unpaid.

On a perusal of the registered Sale Deed dated 02.07.2009, [marked as Exhibit 3/9] it was noted that the Plaintiffs had in fact accepted and acknowledged the payment of the full sale consideration from Respondent No.1, through cheques which were issued prior to the execution of the Sale Deed, during the period 07.07.2008 to 02.07.2009.

As per the Plaintiffs, the Sale Deed was executed on 02.07.2009 in favour of Respondent No.1, which was registered before the Office of the Sub-Registrar, for which the Plaintiffs would have remained personally present. The transaction having been executed through a registered document, was in the public domain, and in the knowledge of the Plaintiffs right from the beginning.

The Trial Court noted that there was no averment in the plaint that the cheques had not been received by them. Once the cheques were received by them, in the normal course, they would have presented the cheques for encashment within 6 months. The Court held that had the Plaintiffs not been able to encash 30 cheques, a complaint ought to have been filed, or proceedings initiated for recovery of the unpaid sale consideration. There was however, nothing on record to show that the Plaintiffs had made any complaint in this regard for a period of

over 5 years.

The Plaintiffs also failed to produce the returned cheques, their passbooks, bank statements, or any other document to support their averments in the plaint.

A notice for transfer of the suit property in the revenue records under Section 135D was served on the Plaintiffs, to which no objection was raised. The name of Respondent No. 1 was entered into the revenue records, which was certified by the Revenue Officer.

The Trial Court held that the period of limitation for filing the suit was 3 years from the date of execution of the Sale Deed dated 02.07.2009. The suit was filed on 15.12.2014. The cause of action as per the averments in the plaint had arisen when the Defendant No.1/Respondent No.1 had issued ‘false’ or ‘bogus’ cheques to the Plaintiffs in 2009. The suit for cancellation of the Sale Deed dated 02.07.2009 could have been filed by 2012, as per Articles 58 and 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The suit was however filed on 15.12.2014, which was barred by limitation. The suit property was subsequently sold by Respondent No.1 to Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 by a registered Sale Deed dated 01.04.2013. Before purchasing the suit property, the Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 had issued a public notice on 14.08.2012. The Plaintiffs did not raise any objection to the same.

The Trial Court, on the basis of the settled position in law, held that the suit of the Plaintiffs was barred by limitation, and allowed the

application under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC.

10. Aggrieved by the Judgment dated 12.08.2016 passed by the Sr. Civil Judge, Surat, the Plaintiffs filed First Appeal No.2324/2016 before the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad.

The Division Bench of the High Court took note of the fact that the Plaintiffs did not deny having executed the registered Sale Deed dated 02.07.2009 in favour of Respondent No.1. In the said Sale Deed, it was specifically admitted and acknowledged by the Plaintiffs that they had received the full sale consideration. The Sale Deed contained the complete particulars with respect to the payment of sale consideration by Respondent No. 1 through 36 cheques, the particulars of which were recorded therein. Since the execution of the Sale Deed was not disputed, and the conveyance was duly registered in the presence of the Plaintiffs before the Sub- Registrar, the Sale Deed could not be declared to be void, illegal, or ineffective.

The suit property was subsequently sold by Respondent No. 1 in favour of Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 vide registered Sale Deed dated 01.04.2013 for a sale consideration of Rs. 2,01,00,000/-.

Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 were bona fide purchasers for valuable consideration.

The present suit for cancellation of the Sale Deed was filed by the Plaintiffs after a period of over 5 years after the execution of the Sale Deed dated 02.07.2009, and 1 year after the execution of the Sale Deed dated 01.04.2013 by Respondent No.1. It was noted that prior to the institution of the suit on 15.12.2014, at no point of time did the Plaintiffs raise any grievance whatsoever, of not having received the full sale consideration mentioned in the Sale Deed dated 02.07.2009. It was for the first time that such an allegation was made after over 5 years from the date of execution of the Sale Deed dated 02.07.2009.

Since the suit in respect of the Sale Deed dated 02.07.2009 was held to be barred by law of limitation, the High Court was of the view that the suit could not be permitted to be continued even with respect to the subsequent Sale Deed dated 01.04.2013. The Plaintiffs had not raised any allegation against Respondent Nos. 2 and 3, and there was no privity of contract between the Plaintiffs and Respondent Nos. 2 and 3.

The High Court rightly affirmed the findings of the Trial Court, and held that the suit was barred by limitation, since it was filed beyond the period of limitation of three years.

11. Aggrieved by the impugned Judgment and Order dated 12.08.2016 passed by the High Court, the original Plaintiff No.1 has filed the present Civil Appeal.

12. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties, perused the plaint and documents filed therewith, as also the written submissions filed on behalf of the parties.

12.1 We will first briefly touch upon the law applicable for deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, which reads as under:

11. Rejection of plaint.– The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases:–

(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;

(b) where the relief claimed in undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;

(c) where the relief claimed is properly valued but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;

(d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law;

(e) where it is not filed in duplicate;

(f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of rule 9 Provided that the time fixed by the Court for the correction of the valuation or supplying of the requisite stamp-paper shall not be extended unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff was prevent by any cause of exceptional nature for correction the valuation or supplying the requisite stamp-paper, as the case may be, within the time fixed by the Court and that refusal to extend such time would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff.”

The remedy under Order VII Rule 11 is an independent and special

remedy, wherein the Court is empowered to summarily dismiss a suit at the threshold, without proceeding to record evidence, and conducting a trial, on the basis of the evidence adduced, if it is satisfied that the action should be terminated on any of the grounds contained in this provision.

The underlying object of Order VII Rule 11 (a) is that if in a suit, no cause of action is disclosed, or the suit is barred by limitation under Rule 11 (d), the Court would not permit the plaintiff to unnecessarily protract the proceedings in the suit. In such a case, it would be necessary to put an end to the sham litigation, so that further judicial time is not wasted.

In Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi1 this Court held that the whole purpose of conferment of powers under this provision is to ensure that a litigation which is meaningless, and bound to prove abortive, should not be permitted to waste judicial time of the court, in the following words :

12. …The whole purpose of conferment of such power is to ensure that a litigation which is meaningless, and bound to prove abortive should not be permitted to occupy the time of the Court, and exercise the mind of the respondent. The sword of Damocles need not be kept hanging over his head unnecessarily without point or purpose. Even if an ordinary civil litigation, the Court readily exercises the power to reject a plaint, if it does not disclose any cause of action.”
12.2 The power conferred on the court to terminate a civil action is, however, a drastic one, and the conditions enumerated in Order VII Rule 11 are required to be strictly adhered to.
12.3 Under Order VII Rule 11, a duty is cast on the Court to determine whether the plaint discloses a cause of action by scrutinizing the averments in the plaint, read in conjunction with the documents relied upon, or whether the suit is barred by any law.

12.4 Order VII Rule 14(1) provides for production of documents, on which the plaintiff places reliance in his suit, which reads as under :

Order 7 Rule 14: Production of document on which plaintiff sues or relies.– (1)Where a plaintiff sues upon a document or relies upon document in his possession or power in support of his claim, he shall enter such documents in a list, and shall produce it in Court when the plaint is presented by him and shall, at the same time deliver the document and a copy thereof, to be filed with the plaint.

(2) Where any such document is not in the possession or power of the plaintiff, he shall, wherever possible, state in whose possession or power it is.

(3) A document which ought to be produced in Court by the plaintiff when the plaint is presented, or to be entered in the list to be added or annexed to the plaint but is not produced or entered accordingly, shall not, without the leave of the Court, be received in evidence on his behalf at the hearing of the suit.

(4) Nothing in this rule shall apply to document produced for the cross examination of the plaintiff's witnesses, or, handed over to a witness merely to refresh his memory.” (emphasis supplied) Having regard to Order VII Rule 14 CPC, the documents filed alongwith the plaint, are required to be taken into consideration for deciding the application under Order VII Rule 11 (a). When a document referred to in the plaint, forms the basis of the plaint, it should be treated as a part of the plaint.

12.5 In exercise of power under this provision, the Court would determine if the assertions made in the plaint are contrary to statutory law, or judicial dicta, for deciding whether a case for rejecting the plaint at the threshold is made out.

12.6 At this stage, the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement and application for rejection of the plaint on the merits, would be irrelevant, and cannot be adverted to, or taken into consideration.

3 12.7 The test for exercising the power under Order VII Rule 11 is that if the averments made in the plaint are taken in entirety, in conjunction with the documents relied upon, would the same result in a decree being passed. This test was laid down in Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. v. M.V.Sea Success I & Anr.,4 which reads as :

139. Whether a plaint discloses a cause of action or not is essentially a question of fact. But whether it does or does not must be found out from reading the plaint itself. For the said purpose, the averments made in the plaint in their entirety must be held to be correct. The test is as to whether if the averments made in the plaint are taken to be correct in their entirety, a decree would be passed.” In Hardesh Ores (P.) Ltd. v. Hede & Co.5 the Court further held that it is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage, and to read it in isolation. It is the substance, and not merely the form, which has to be looked into. The plaint has to be construed as it stands, without addition or subtraction of words. If the allegations in the plaint prima facie show a cause of action, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry whether the allegations are true in fact.

12.8 If on a meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found that the suit is manifestly vexatious and without any merit, and does not disclose a right to sue, the court would be justified in exercising the power under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.

12.9 The power under Order VII Rule 11 CPC may be exercised by the Court at any stage of the suit, either before registering the plaint, or after issuing summons to the defendant, or before conclusion of the trial, as held by this Court in the judgment of Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra. The plea that once issues are framed, the matter must necessarily go to trial was repelled by this Court in Azhar Hussain (supra).

12.10 The provision of Order VII Rule 11 is mandatory in nature. It states that the plaint “shall” be rejected if any of the grounds specified in clause (a) to (e) are made out. If the Court finds that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action, or that the suit is barred by any law, the Court has no option, but to reject the plaint.

13. “Cause of action” means every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to judgment. It consists of a bundle of material facts, which are necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to entitle him to the reliefs claimed in the suit.

In Swamy Atmanand v. Sri Ramakrishna Tapovanam8 this Court held :

24. A cause of action, thus, means every fact, which if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove an order to support his right to a judgment of the court. In other words, it is a bundle of facts, which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. It must include some act done by the defendant since in the absence of such an act, no cause of action can possibly accrue. It is not limited to the actual infringement of the right sued on but includes all the material facts on which it is founded” (emphasis supplied) In T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal & Anr.9 this Court held that while considering an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC what is required to be decided is whether the plaint discloses a real cause of action, or something purely illusory, in the following words : -
5. …The learned Munsiff must remember that if on a meaningful – not formal – reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, he should exercise his power under O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C. taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing …” Subsequently, in I.T.C. Ltd. v. Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal, this Court held that law cannot permit clever drafting which creates illusions of a cause of action. What is required is that a clear right must be made out in the plaint.

If, however, by clever drafting of the plaint, it has created the illusion of a cause of action, this Court in Madanuri Sri Ramachandra Murthy v. Syed Jalal held that it should be nipped in the bud, so that bogus litigation will end at the earliest stage.

The Court must be vigilant against any camouflage or suppression, and determine whether the litigation is utterly vexatious, and an abuse of the process of the court.

14. The Limitation Act, 1963 prescribes a time-limit for the institution of all suits, appeals, and applications. Section 2(j) defines the expression “period of limitation” to mean the period of limitation prescribed in the Schedule for suits, appeals or applications. Section 3 lays down that every suit instituted after the prescribed period, shall be dismissed even though limitation may not have been set up as a defence. If a suit is not covered by any specific article, then it would fall within the residuary article.

Articles 58 and 59 of the Schedule to the 1963 Act, prescribe the period of limitation for filing a suit where a declaration is sought, or cancellation of an instrument, or rescission of a contract, which reads as under :

Description of suit Period of Time from which limitation period begins to run
58. To obtain any Three years When the right to other declaration. sue first accrues.
         59. To cancel or set     Three years     When       the    facts
         aside an instrument                             entitling the plaintiff
         or decree or for the                              to      have        the
         rescission    of   a                                instrument or decree
         contract.                              		       cancelled   or    set
                                 	       aside or the contract
                                	       rescinded   first
                         		               become known to
                   		                              him.
The period of limitation prescribed under Articles 58 and 59 of the 1963 Act is three years, which commences from the date when the right to sue first accrues.

In Khatri Hotels Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India & Anr.,12 this Court held that the use of the word ‘first’ between the words ‘sue’ and ‘accrued’, would mean that if a suit is based on multiple causes of action, the period of limitation will begin to run from the date when the right to sue first accrues. That is, if there are successive violations of the right, it would not give rise to a fresh cause of action, and the suit will be liable to be dismissed, if it is beyond the period of limitation counted from the date when the right to sue first accrued. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of Punjab v. Gurdev Singh, held that the Court must examine the plaint and determine when the right to sue first accrued to the plaintiff, and whether on the assumed facts, the plaint is within time. The words “right to sue” means the right to seek relief by means of legal proceedings. The right to sue accrues only when the cause of action arises. The suit must be instituted when the right asserted in the suit is infringed, or when there is a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe such right by the defendant against whom the suit is instituted.

Order VII Rule 11(d) provides that where a suit appears from the averments in the plaint to be barred by any law, the plaint shall be rejected.

15. Analysis and Findings We have carefully perused the averments in the plaint read with the documents relied upon.

15.1 On a reading of the plaint and the documents relied upon, it is clear that the Plaintiffs have admitted the execution of the registered Sale Deed dated 02.07.2009 in favour of Defendant No.1/Respondent No.1 herein.

Para 5 of the plaint reads as :

(5) …Thus, subject of the aforesaid terms the plaintiffs had executed sale deed selling the suit property to the opponent no.1 vide sale deed dated 02/07/2009 bearing Sr.No. 5158…” The case made out in the Plaint is that even though they had executed the registered Sale Deed dated 02.07.2009 for a sale consideration of Rs.1,74,02,000, an amount of only Rs.40,000 was paid to them. The remaining 31 cheques mentioned in the Sale Deed, which covered the balance amount of Rs.1,73,62,000 were alleged to be “bogus” or “false”, and allegedly remained unpaid.

We find the averments in the Plaint completely contrary to the recitals in the Sale Deed dated 02.07.2009, which was admittedly executed by the Plaintiffs in favour of Respondent No.1. In the Sale Deed, the Plaintiffs have expressly and unequivocally acknowledged that the entire sale consideration was “paid” by Defendant No.1/Respondent No.1 herein to the Plaintiffs.

Clauses 3 and 4 of the Sale Deed are extracted hereinbelow for ready reference : -

Since the full amount of consideration of the sale as decided above, has since been paid by you the Vendees to we the Vendors of this sale deed, for which we the Vendors of this sale deed acknowledge the same so, we or our descendants, guardian or legal heirs is to take any dispute or objection in future that such amount is not received, or is received less, and if we do so then, the same shall be void by this deed and, if any loss or damage occurs due to the same then, we the Vendors of this sale deed and descendants, guardians, legal heirs of we the vendors are liable to the pay the same to you the vendees or your descendants, guardian, legal heirs and you can recover the same by

court proceedings.

(4) We the party of Second part i.e. Vendors of the sale deed since received full consideration on the above facts, the physical possession, occupancy of the land or the property mentioned in this sale deed has been handed over to you the Vendee of this sale deed, and that has been occupied and taken in possession of the land or property mentioned in this sale deed by you the Vendee of this sale deed by coming at the site and therefore, we the Vendors of this sale deed have not to raise any dispute in the future that the possession of the land or the property has not been handed over to you. …”

The Sale Deed records that the 36 cheques covering the entire sale consideration of Rs.1,74,02,000 were “paid” to the Plaintiffs, during the period between 07.07.2008 to 02.07.2009.

15.2 If the case made out in the Plaint is to be believed, it would mean that almost 99% of the sale consideration i.e. Rs.1,73,62,000 allegedly remained unpaid throughout. It is, however inconceivable that if the payments had remained unpaid, the Plaintiffs would have remained completely silent for a period of over 5 and ½ years, without even issuing a legal notice for payment of the unpaid sale consideration, or instituting any proceeding for recovery of the amount, till the filing of the present suit in December 2014.

15.3 The Plaintiffs have made out a case of alleged non-payment of a part of the sale consideration in the Plaint, and prayed for the relief of

cancellation of the Sale Deed on this ground.

Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 provides as under :
54. ‘Sale’ defined.—‘Sale’ is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised.” The definition of “sale” indicates that there must be a transfer of ownership from one person to another i.e. transfer of all rights and interest in the property, which was possessed by the transferor to the transferee. The transferor cannot retain any part of the interest or right in the property, or else it would not be a sale. The definition further indicates that the transfer of ownership has to be made for a “price paid or promised or part paid ans part promised”. Price thus constitutes an essential ingredient of the transaction of sale.

In Vidyadhar v. Manikrao & Anr. this Court held that the words “price paid or promised or part paid and part promised” indicates that actual payment of the whole of the price at the time of the execution of the Sale Deed is not a sine qua non for completion of the sale. Even if the whole of the price is not paid, but the document is executed, and thereafter registered, the sale would be complete, and the title would pass on to the transferee under the transaction. The non-payment of a part of the sale price would not affect the validity of the sale. Once the title in the property has already passed, even if the balance sale consideration is not paid, the sale could not be invalidated on this ground. In order to constitute a “sale”, the parties must intend to transfer the ownership of the property, on the agreement to pay the price either in praesenti, or in future. The intention is to be gathered from the recitals of the sale deed, the conduct of the parties, and the evidence on record.

In view of the law laid down by this Court, even if the averments of the Plaintiffs are taken to be true, that the entire sale consideration had not in fact been paid, it could not be a ground for cancellation of the Sale Deed. The Plaintiffs may have other remedies in law for recovery of the balance consideration, but could not be granted the relief of cancellation of the registered Sale Deed. We find that the suit filed by the Plaintiffs is vexatious, meritless, and does not disclose a right to sue. The plaint is liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 (a).

15.4 The Plaintiffs have averred in the plaint that the period of limitation commenced on 21.11.2014, when they obtained a copy of the index of the Sale Deed dated 02.07.2009, and discovered the alleged fraud committed by Defendant No.1.

The relevant extract from the plaint in this regard is set out hereinbelow :–

(7) … Not only that but also, on obtaining the copy of the index of the sale deed of the acts committed by the Opponent No.1, 4, 5 and on obtaining the certified copy of the sale deed, we the plaintiffs could come to know on 21-11-2014 that, the Opponent No.1 had in collusion with Opponent No.4, 5 mentioned the false cheques stated below in the so called sale deed with intention to commit fraud and no any consents of we the plaintiffs have also been obtained in that regard. The said cheques have not been received to we the plaintiffs or no any amounts of the said cheques have been credited in accounts of we the plaintiffs. Thus, the cheques which have been mentioned in the agreement caused to have been executed by the Opponent No.1, the false cheques have been mentioned of the said amounts. Not only that but also, the agricultural land under the suit had been sold by the Opponent No.1 to the Opponent No.2 Dillipbhai Gordhanbhai Sonani and the Opponent No.3, Laljibhai Gordhanbhai Sonani on 1-4-2013 for Rs.2,01,00,000/- as if the said sale deed was having clear title deeds. On taking out the copy of the said sale deed with seal and signature on 21-11-2014, it could come to the knowledge of we the plaintiffs. We the plaintiffs have not done any signature or witness on the said agreement. The said agreement is not binding to we the plaintiffs. Since the said agreement is since null, void and invalid as well as illegal, therefore, no any Court fee stamp duty is required to be paid by we the plaintiff on the said agreement and for that we the plaintiffs rely upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in A.I.R.2010, Supreme Court, Page No. 2807. …” The plea taken in the plaint that they learnt of the alleged fraud in 2014, on receipt of the index of the Sale Deed, is wholly misconceived, since the receipt of the index would not constitute the cause of action for filing the suit. On a reading of the plaint, it is clear that the cause of action arose on the non-payment of the bulk of the sale consideration, which event occurred in the year 2009. The plea taken by the Plaintiffs is to create an illusory cause of action, so as to overcome the period of limitation. The plea raised is rejected as being meritless and devoid of any truth.

15.5 The conduct of the Plaintiffs in not taking recourse to legal action for over a period of 5 and ½ years from the execution of the Sale Deed in 2009, for payment of the balance sale consideration, also reflects that the institution of the present suit is an after-thought. The Plaintiffs apparently filed the suit after the property was further sold by Respondent No.1 to Respondent Nos. 2 and 3, to cast a doubt on the title of Respondent No.1 to the suit property.

15.6 The Plaintiffs have placed reliance on the Order of the Collector dated 19.06.2009 with the plaint. The Order reveals that the permission was granted subject to the fulfilment of certain conditions. Clause 4 of the permission states that :

(4) The purchaser of the land/property, shall have to make the

payment of the price of the land by cheque and its reference shall require to be made in the Sale Deed.” If the Plaintiffs had a genuine grievance of non-payment of the balance sale consideration, the Plaintiffs could have moved for revocation of the permission granted by the Collector on 19.06.2009.

Clause 6 of the Order provided that :

(6) On making violation of any of the aforesaid terms, the permission shall automatically be treated as cancelled and, separate proceeding shall be taken up for the violation of the terms and conditions.” The Plaintiffs did not make any complaint whatsoever to the Collector at any point of time. The conduct of the Plaintiffs is reflective of lack of bona fide.

15.7 The present case is a classic case, where the plaintiffs by clever drafting of the plaint, attempted to make out an illusory cause of action, and bring the suit within the period of limitation.

Prayer 1 of the plaint reads as :

1) The suit property being agricultural land of old tenure of Revenue Survey No.610 whose block Number is 573 situated at village Mota Varachha, Sub-district : Surat city, Dis : Surat has been registered by the opponent No.1 of this case in office of the Sub-Registrar (Katar Gam) at Surat vide Serial No.5158 in book No.1. Since, the same is illegal, void, in-effective and since the amount of consideration is received by the plaintiffs, and by holding that it is not binding to the plaintiffs and to cancel the same, and since the sale deed as aforesaid suit property has been executed by the opponent No.1 to the opponent No.2, 3, it is registered in the office of Sub-registrar, Surat (Rander) on 01/04/2013 vide serial No.443 which is not binding to we the plaintiffs. Since, it is illegal, void, in-effective and therefore, this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to cancel the same and this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to send the Yadi in that regard to the Sub-registrar, Surat (Karat Gam) and the Sub- Registrar (Rander) in regard to the cancellation of both the aforesaid documents.” The Plaintiffs deliberately did not mention the date of the registered Sale Deed dated 02.07.2009 executed by them in favour of Respondent No.1, since it would be evident that the suit was barred by limitation. The prayer however mentions the date of the subsequent Sale Deed i.e. 01.04.2013 when the suit property was further sold by Respondent No.1 to Respondent Nos. 2 & 3.

The omission of the date of execution of the Sale Deed on 02.07.2009 in the prayer clause, was done deliberately and knowingly, so as to mislead the Court on the issue of limitation.

15.8 The delay of over 5 and ½ years after the alleged cause of action arose in 2009, shows that the suit was clearly barred by limitation as per Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The suit was instituted on 15.12.2014, even though the alleged cause of action arose in 2009, when the last cheque was delivered to the Plaintiffs.

The Plaintiffs have failed to discharge the onus of proof that the suit was filed within the period of limitation. The plaint is therefore, liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 (d) of CPC.

Reliance is placed on the recent judgment of this Court rendered in Raghwendra Sharan Singh v. Ram Prasanna Singh (Dead) by LRs.15 wherein this Court held the suit would be barred by limitation under Article 59 of the Limitation Act, if it was filed beyond three years of the execution of the registered deed.

15.9 The Plaintiffs have also prayed for cancellation of the subsequent Sale Deed dated 01.04.2013 executed by Respondent No.1 in favour of Respondent Nos. 2 and 3; since the suit in respect of the 1st Sale Deed dated 02.07.2009 is rejected both under clauses (a) and (d) of Order VII Rule 11, the prayer with respect to the 2nd Sale Deed dated 01.04.2003 cannot be entertained.

16. The present suit filed by the Plaintiffs is clearly an abuse of the process of the court, and bereft of any merit.

The Trial Court has rightly exercised the power under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, by allowing the application filed by Respondent Nos. 2 & 3, which was affirmed by the High Court.

In view of the aforesaid discussion, the present Civil Appeal is dismissed with costs of Rs. 1,00,000/- payable by the Appellant to Respondent Nos. 2 and 3, within a period of twelve weeks from the date of this Judgment.

Pending applications, if any, are accordingly disposed of.

...…...............………………J.

(L. NAGESWARA RAO) ...…...............………………J.

(INDU MALHOTRA) July 09, 2020; New Delhi.



Tuesday, March 16, 2021

Intellectual Property Rights

 

If services offered by a company are similar to those offered by another company the court held the later company to be responsible for passing off and controlled him from using the misleadingly similar domain names.


Delhi High Court

Yahoo!, Inc. vs Akash Arora & Anr. on 19 February, 1999

Equivalent citations: 1999 IIAD Delhi 229, 78 (1999) DLT 285

Author: . M Sharma

Bench: . M Sharma

ORDER Dr. M.K. Sharma, J.

1. The present suit has been instituted by the plaintiff against the defendants seeking for a decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendants, their partners, servants and agents from operating any business and/or selling, offering for sale, advertising and in any manner dealing in any services or goods on the Internet or otherwise under the trademark/domain name 'Yahooindia.Com' or any other mark/domain name which is identical with or deceptively similar to the plaintiff's trademark 'Yahoo!' and also for rendition of accounts and damages. The plaintiff has also filed an application under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 CPC praying for an ad interim temporary injunction restraining the defendants from operating any business and/or selling, offering for sale, advertising and in any manner dealing in any services or goods on the Internet or otherwise under the trademark/domain name 'Yahooindia.Com' or any other mark/domain name which is identical with or deceptively similar to the plaintiff's trademark 'Yahoo!'.

2. Mr. Kapil Sibbal, counsel appearing for the plaintiff submitted that the plaintiff is the owner of the trademark 'Yahoo!' and domain name 'Yahoo.Com', which are very well-known and have acquired distinctive reputation and goodwill and the defendants by adopting the name 'Yahooindia' for similar services have been passing off the services and goods of the defendants as that of the plaintiff's trademark 'Yahoo!' which is identical to or deceptively similar to the plaintiff's trademark. It was submitted that a domain name/trademark adopted by the plaintiff is entitled to equal protection against passing off as in the case of a trademark. In support of his submission, the learned counsel heavily relied upon the ratio of the decisions in Marks & Spencer Vs. One-in-a-Million; reported in 1998 FSR 265. It was submitted that the trademarks and domain names are not mutually exclusive and there is an overlap between the trademarks and services rendered under domain names and thus by adopting a deceptively similar trademark 'Yahooindia', the defendants have verbatim copied the format, contents, lay out, colour scheme, source code of the plaintiff's prior created regional section on India at Yahoo.com.sg and thus passing off the services of the defendants as that of the plaintiff. He submitted that Internet users are familiar with the practice of companies to select domain names that incorporate their company name, well-known trademark, and/or product/service name and generally attempt to locate a particular company's Web site by simply typing in www.(company name).com or www.(product name).com when they are unsure of the Internet address of the Company. According to him, thus, it would not be unusual for someone looking for an authorised 'Yahoo!' site with India-specific content to type in 'Yahooindia.com',i.e., the defendants' domain name and thereby instead of reaching the Internet site of the plaintiff, the said person would reach the Internet site of the defendants'. He further submitted that the plaintiff in fact provides extensive content on India, both on its Yahoo! Asia site and at its main Yahoo.com site, under the categories "Regional:Countries:India". It was submitted that the defendants being in the same line of activity as that of the plaintiff, the defendants have tried to be 'cyber-squatters' and, thus, dishonesty is writ large as the defendants have adopted a trademark similar to that of the plaintiff which is 'Yahoo.com' which has acquired a distinctive name, goodwill and reputation.

3. Mr. Harish Malhotra, counsel appearing for the defendants, however, refuted the aforesaid allegations and submitted that the trademark laws in India relate to goods and, therefore, the provisions of Indian Trade Marks Act are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case which deals only with goods. It was also submitted that the trademark/domain name 'Yahoo!' of the plaintiff is not registered in India and, therefore, there cannot be an action for infringement of the registered mark nor could there be any action of passing off as the services rendered both by the plaintiff and the defendants cannot be said to be goods within the meaning of the Indian Trade Marks Act which is concerned only with goods and not services and thus the decisions relied upon by the counsel appearing for the plaintiff are not relevant for the purpose of deciding the present case. He further submitted that the word "Yahoo!" is a general dictionary word and is not vented and, therefore, it could not have acquired any distinctiveness and since the defendants have been using disclaimer, there could be no chance of any deception and thus, no action of passing of is maintainable against the defendants. He also submitted that the persons using Internet and seeking to reach the Internet site are all technically educated and literate persons and, therefore, there is no possibility of any customer reaching the Internet site of the defendants with the intention of reaching the Internet site of the plaintiff and thus, it is not a case of unwary customer which is applicable in a case of infringement and passing off of the trademark. In the light of the aforesaid submissions, let me now consider as to whether the plaintiff has been able to make out a prima facie case for grant of temporary injunction as sought for in the application.

4. The domain name 'Yahoo.com' is registered in the plaintiff's favour with Network Solution Inc since 18th January, 1995. The trademark 'Yahoo!' and its variance are registered or pending registration in 69 countries of the world. As is disclosed from the records, an application for registration of the trademark of the plaintiff 'Yahoo!' is also pending in India. The plaintiff is a global Internet media rendering services under the domain name/trade name 'Yahoo!'. The Internet is a global collection of computer networks linking millions of public and private computers around the world. The Internet is now recognised as an international system, a communication medium that allows anyone from any part of the lobe with access to the Internet to freely exchange information and share data. The Internet provides information about various corporations, products as also on various subjects like educational, entertainment, commercial, government activities and services. A computer or device that is attached to the Internet has an address which is known as Domain name. The same is established by using suffix 'com' and registering with Network Solutions Inc. A domain name identifies a computer or a Sub Network of computers in the Internet. One way to establish a presence on the Internet is by placing a web page. The plaintiff, it is stated, was amongst the first in the field to have a domain name 'Yahoo' and also to start a Web directory and provide search services. In June, 1994, the said directory was named 'Yahoo!' which is a dictionary connotation which was adopted by the plaintiff and is providing the said service at the Internet under the domain name/trade name 'Yahoo!'.

5. The plaintiff is admittedly providing various services including services on the regional section also. In view of growing popularity of 'Yahoo!' of the plaintiff, it was submitted that many third parties started imitations by using sound-alike names in order to appropriate the reputation and goodwill acquired by the plaintiff in respect of the trademark/name 'Yahoo!' in India and that the defendants is one of such parties who in order to appropriate the reputation and goodwill acquired by the plaintiff in respect of the said trademark 'Yahoo!' adopted the trademark/domain name 'Yahooindia.com' for their Internet site although their trading name is Net link Internet Solutions.

6. Let me, therefore, examine the rival contentions and defense raised by the defendants one by one.

7. One of the submissions was that the domain name 'Yahoo!' of the plaintiff is not used in relations to goods, but, in relations to services and since services are not included within the ambit of section under Sections 27(2) and 29 of the Trade Mark Merchandise Act (referred to as the 'Act' in short) and, therefore, the plaintiff cannot plead for action of passing off in relation to such services. In support of his submission, the learned counsel drew my attention to the provisions of Section 2(5), Sections 27, 29 and Section 30 of the Act and contended that only goods are recognised for the purpose of preferring an action for infringement or passing off. Admittedly the present case is not for an action for infringement of a registered trademark, but, an action for passing off. The law relating to passing off is fairly well-settled. The principle underlying the action is that no man is entitled to carry on his business in such a way as to lead to the belief that he is carrying on the business of another man or to lead to believe that he is carrying on or has any connection with the business carried on by another man. It is also well-established that passing off action is a common law remedy. There are a plethora of cases wherein it has been held that the principles of common law govern actions of passing off and have been recognised by Section 27(2) and Section 106 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958. In this commentary, reference may be made to the well-known treatise on the law of Trademarks and passing off, of P. Narayanan. In paragraph 25.102 of the fourth edition of the said treatise, it is stated thus:-

"The general principles of the law applicable to cases where a person uses a name or intends to use a name which is likely to deceive and divert the business of the plaintiff to the defendant or cause confusion between the two businesses are analogous to the principles which are applicable to ordinary cases of passing off relating to sale of goods."

8. Reference may be made to the decision of this Court in Monetary Over seas Vs. Montari Industries Ltd.; reported in 1996 PTC 142, wherein it was found that the defendant adopted a trade name that was identical to that of the plaintiff and the court while injuncting the defendant held thus:-

"When a defendant does business under a name which is sufficiently close to the name under which the plaintiff is trading and that name has acquired a reputation and the public at large is likely to be misled that the defendant's business is the business of the plaintiff, or is a branch or department of the plaintiff, the defendant is liable for an action in passing off."

Similarly, there are other cases wherein the services rendered by a person have been included within the scope of passing off. In this connection, reference may be made to the decisions in Neev Investments & Trading Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Sasia Express Couriers; reported in 1993 PTC 184. In Ellora Industries Vs. Banarsi Dass & Ors.; reported in 1981 PTC 46, it was held that the plaintiffs and the defendants are direct competitors and 'Ellora' as a business name suggests association with the plaintiffs' registered trade mark and, it is suggestive of the fact that the goods come from the same source and, therefore, is a misrepresentation for business purposes as to the origin of goods which the defendants manufacture in the course of their business. In paragraph 12 of the said judgment, it was held thus:

PASSING OFF:

"12. The purpose of this tort is to protect commercial goodwill to ensure that peoples' business reputations are not exploited. Since business "goodwill is an asset, and therefore species of property the law protects it against encroachment as such. The tort is based on economic policy, the need to encourage enterprise and to ensure commercial stability. It secures a reasonable area of monopoly to traders. It is thus complementary to trade mark law which is founded upon statute rather than common law. But there is a difference between statute law relating to trade marks and the passing off action; for, while registration of relevant mark itself gives title to the registered owner, the onus in a passing off action lies upon the plaintiff to establish the existence of the business reputation which he seeks to protect. The asset protected is the reputation the plaintiffs' business has in the relevant mark. This is a complex thing. It is manifested in the various indication which lead the client or customer to associate the business with the plaintiff; such as the name of the business, whether real or adopted, the mark, design, make up or colour of the plaintiffs goods, the distinctive characteristics of services he supplies or the nature of his special processes. And it is around encroachments upon such indicant that passing off actions arise. What is protected is an economic asset:" (emphasis is mine)

9. Lord Halsbury defined the tort of passing off in Reddaway Vs. Banham; reported in 1696 A.C. 199. In paragraph 31 of the aforesaid decision of this Court in Ellora Industries (supra) it was said that it is not always necessary that there must be in existence goods of that other man with which the defendant seeks to confuse his own. Reference was also made to the observation of Lord Greene M.R., who observed that:-

"Passing off may occur in cases where the plaintiffs do not in fact deal with the offending goods".

10. Therefore, it is obvious that where the parties are engaged in common or overlapping fields of activity, the competition would take place. If the two contesting parties are involved in the same line or similar line of business, there is grave and immense possibility for confusion and deception and, therefore, there is probability of sufferance of damage. In this case also both the plaintiff and the defendants have common field of activity. They are operating on the Web site and providing information almost similar in nature. In Card service International Inc. Vs. McGee; reported in 42 USPQ 2d 1850, it was held that the domain name serve same function as the trademark and is not a mere address or like finding number on the Internet and, therefore, it is entitled to equal protection as trademark. It was further held that a domain name is more than a mere Internet address for it also identifies the Internet site to those who reach it, much like a person's name identifies a particular person or more relevant to trade mark disputes, a company's name identifies a specific company. Accordingly, the Court granted the injunction upon consideration of the relevant law namely, Section 32 of the Lanham Act. In the facts of the said case it was held that Cardservice International's customers who wish to take advantage of its Internet services, but do not know its domain name are likely to assume that "cardservice.com" belongs to cardservice International. It goes on to hold that these customers would instead reach McGee and see a home page for "Card Service" and thereby many would assume that they have reached Cardservice International.

11. In Marks & Spencer Vs. One-in-a-Million; reported in 1998 FSR 265, it was held that any person who deliberately registers a domain name on account of its similarity to the name, brand name or trademark of an unconnected commercial organisation must expect to find himself on the receiving end of an injunction to restrain the threat of passing off, and the injunction will be in terms which will make the name commercially useless to the dealer. It was held in the said decision that the name 'marksandspencer' could not have been chosen for any other reason than that it was associated with the well-known retailing group. The decision further goes on to say that where the value of a name consists solely in its resemblance to the name or trade mark of another enterprise, the Court will normally assume that the public is likely to be deceived, for why else would the defendants choose it? It was also said that someone seeking or coming upon a website called http:// marksandspencer.co.uk would naturally assume that it was that of the plaintiffs. Thus, it is seen that although the word 'services' may not find place in the expression used in Sections 27 and 29 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, services rendered have come to be recognised for an action of passing off. Thus law of passing off is an action under the common law which also is given a statutory recognition in the Trade Mark Act. Thus in the context and light of the aforesaid decisions and the development in the concept of law of passing off, it is too late in the day to submit that passing off action cannot be maintained as against services as it could be maintained for goods.

12. The services of the plaintiff under the trademark/domain name 'Yahoo!' have been widely publicised and written about globally. In an Internet service, a particular Internet site could be reached by anyone anywhere in the world who proposes to visit the said Internet site. With the advancement and progress in technology, services rendered in the Internet has also come to be recognised and accepted and are being given protection so as to protect such provider of service from passing off the services rendered by others as that of the plaintiff. As a matter of fact in a matter where services rendered through the domain name in the Internet, a very alert vigil is necessary and a strict view is to be taken for its easy access and reach by anyone from any corner of the globe. There can be no two opinions that the two marks/domain names 'Yahoo!' of the plaintiff and 'Yahooindia' of the defendant are almost similar except for use of the suffix 'India' in the latter. The degree of the similarity of the marks usually is vitally important and significant in an action for passing off for in such a case there is every possibility and likelihood of confusion and deception being caused. When both the domain names are considered, it is crystal clear that the two names being almost identical or similar in nature, there is every possibility of an Internet user being confused and deceived in believing that both the domain names belong to one common source and connection, although the two belong to two different concerns.

13. Counsel for the defendant also argued that the Internet users are sophisticated users and only literate people who are able to ascertain can approach the actual Internet site that they intend to visit. The said submission does not appear to have force for even if an individual is a sophisticated user of the Internet, he may be an unsophisticated consumer of information and such a person may find his/her way to the defendant Internet site which provides almost similar type of information as that of the plaintiff and thereby confusion could be created in the mind of the said person who intends to visit the Internet site of the plaintiff, but, in fact reaches the Internet site of the defendant.

14. It is also submitted that the defendant has been issuing a disclaimer. The said disclaimer being used by the defendants cannot eliminate the problem , for it was observed in the case of Jews for Jesus Vs. Brodsky; reported in 46 USPQ 2d 1652 that due to the nature of Internet use, defendant's appropriation of plaintiff's mark as a domain name and home page address cannot adequately be remedied by a disclaimer. It was also observed that considering the vastness of the Internet and its relatively recent availability to the general public, many Internet users are not sophisticated enough to distinguish between the subtle difference in the domain names of the parties. The ratio and principle laid down in the aforesaid decision equally apply to the facts of the present case with full force.

15. Counsel for the defendants also submitted that there is sufficient added matter, namely, addition of the word 'India" to distinguish its domain name from that of the plaintiff and in support of his submission, the learned counsel relied upon the decision in Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt Sharma Vs. Navaratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories; . In Ruston and Hornby Ltd. Vs. Zamindara Engineering Co.; reported in 1970 S.C.1649, it was held that if there be close resemblance between the two marks and they are deceptively similar to each other, the word 'India' added to one mark is of no consequence. In that case the two marks were 'Ruston' and 'Ruston India'. Besides the plaintiff itself is using regional names after Yahoo! like Yahoo.CA (for Canada) and Yahoo.FR (for France). Thus, there is every possibility of the Internet users to believe that Yahoo india is another one in the series of Yahoo marks/names and thereby there is every possibility of confusion being created and thereby preventing these users from reaching the Internet site of the plaintiff. The decision in Vishnu das Trading Vs. Vizier Sultan; reported in 1996 PTC 152 at 535 relied upon by the defendant deals with the rectification of registration of a trademark and thus may not be an appropriate case for the present case. The decisions relied upon by the counsel for the defendant are not applicable to the facts of the present case and have no application in the facts and circumstances of the present case as the services offered in the present case by the plaintiff and the defendant are identical since both of them provide Internet programs and on line information to users regarding various categories of applications like arts, humanities, employment, entertainment, etc.

16. The contention of the learned counsel for the defendant that the word 'Yahoo!' is a dictionary word and, therefore, cannot be appropriated as a domain name/trademark is also misplaced as there are number of such words being used by various companies as their trademarks. The said words although are dictionary words have acquired uniqueness and distinctiveness and are associated with the business of the concerned company and such words have come to receive maximum degree of protection by courts as was done also in the case of 'WHIRLPOOL'. In the said decision namely N.R. Dongre Vs. Whirlpool Corp.; reported in 1996 PTC (16), a Division Bench of this Court recognised the distinctiveness and uniqueness of the word 'WHIRLPOOL' which was subsequently upheld by the Supreme Court in its decision reported in 1996 PTC 583. 'WHIRLPOOL' is otherwise a dictionary word and was not registered in India as a trademark. The court considering the entire gamut of the case held that the reputation of the trademark 'WHIRLPOOL' in respect of washing machines has travelled transborder to India and, therefore, although the respondents are not the registered proprietor of the 'WHIRLPOOL' in India in respect of washing machines can maintain action of passing off against the appellants in respect of the use of the same which has been registered in their favour in respect of the same goods. In the said decision, it was also held that registration of a trademark under the Act would be irrelevant in an action of passing off.

17. The defense as raised in the present suit by the defendants is, therefore, prima facie found to be without any merit. The counsel for the defendants during the course of his submissions submitted that the defendants have not been using or copying the contents of the programmes of the plaintiff and have no objection even if such an injunction is granted restraining the defendants from using or copying the contents of the programmes of the plaintiff. In my considered opinion and as discussed above, the plaintiff has been able to make out a prima facie case for grant of ad interim injunction in its favour and, therefore, an ad interim injunction is passed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants restraining the defendants their partners, servants and agents from operating any business or selling, offering for sale, advertising and/or in any manner dealing in service or goods on the Internet or otherwise under the trademark/domain name 'Yahooindia.com' or any other trademark/domain name which is identical with or deceptively similar to the plaintiff trademark 'Yahoo!' till the disposal of the suit. The defendants and all others acting on their behalf are further restrained from using and/or copying the contents of the programmes of the plaintiff under the domain name 'Yahoo.com'.

18. In terms of the aforesaid order, the application filed by the plaintiff seeking for injunction stands disposed of. It is, however, made clear that all opinions and views expressed in this order are my tentative and prima facie view and shall not be treated as the final opinion on the merit of the case.