Tuesday, September 29, 2020

The devotees are entitled to offer voluntary service known as “Uzhavara pani”.

The question that arises for my consideration in this writ petition is whether the Executive Officer of Arulmighu Dhandayuthapani Swami Temple, Palani is competent to issue the impugned tender notification dated 20.08.2020 inviting sealed tenders for providing house keeping service in the Hill temple and the institutions attached to it.

2.The writ petitioner contends that the devotees are entitled to offer voluntary service known as “Uzhavara pani”. By entrusting the cleaning and maintenance works to outsiders in the name of house keeping contract, the temple management has infringed the rights of the devotees. The second respondent temple is not having a regular trust board for almost a decade. The Executive Officer of the temple acts as ex-officio Fit Person. Such an official cannot take major decisions having financial implications. The impugned tender notification is violative of the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”)

 

Click to view the entire judgement.

 


Monday, September 28, 2020

There cannot be a sale by execution of a power of attorney nor can there be a transfer by execution of an agreement of sale


                   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


Special Leave Petition (C) No. 13917 of 2009


Decided On: 11.10.2011


Suraj Lamp and Industries Pvt. Ltd.Vs.State of Haryana and Anr.


Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.V. Raveendran, A.K. Patnaik and H.L. Gokhale, JJ.

Citation: (2012) 1 SCC 656


1. By an earlier order dated 15.5.2009 (reported in Suraj Lamp and Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Haryana and Anr. MANU/SC/1021/2009 : 2009 (7) SCC 363 we had referred to the ill-effects of what is known as General Power of Attorney Sales (for short 'GPA Sales') or Sale Agreement/General Power of Attorney/Will transfers (for short 'SA/GPA/WILL' transfers). Both the descriptions are misnomers as there cannot be a sale by execution of a power of attorney nor can there be a transfer by execution of an agreement of sale and a power of attorney and will. As noticed in the earlier order, these kinds of transactions were evolved to avoid prohibitions/conditions regarding certain transfers, to avoid payment of stamp duty and registration charges on deeds of conveyance, to avoid payment of capital gains on transfers, to invest unaccounted money ('black money') and to avoid payment of 'unearned increases' due to Development Authorities on transfer.


2. The modus operandi in such SA/GPA/WILL transactions is for the vendor or person claiming to be the owner to receive the agreed consideration, deliver possession of the property to the purchaser and execute the following documents or variations thereof:


(a) An Agreement of sale by the vendor in favor of the purchaser confirming the terms of sale, delivery of possession and payment of full consideration and undertaking to execute any document as and when required in future.


Or


An agreement of sale agreeing to sell the property, with a separate affidavit confirming receipt of full price and delivery of possession and undertaking to execute sale deed whenever required.


(b) An Irrevocable General Power of Attorney by the vendor in favor of the purchaser or his nominee authorizing him to manage, deal with and dispose of the property without reference to the vendor.


Or


A General Power of Attorney by the vendor in favor of the purchaser or his nominee authorizing the attorney holder to sell or transfer the property and a Special Power of Attorney to manage the property.


(c) A will bequeathing the property to the purchaser (as a safeguard against the consequences of death of the vendor before transfer is effected).


These transactions are not to be confused or equated with genuine transactions where the owner of a property grants a power of Attorney in favor of a family member or friend to manage or sell his property, as he is not able to manage the property or execute the sale, personally. These are transactions, where a purchaser pays the full price, but instead of getting a deed of conveyance gets a SA/GPA/WILL as a mode of transfer, either at the instance of the vendor or at his own instance.


III-Effects of SA/GPA/WILL transactions


3. The earlier order dated 15.5.2009, noted the ill-effects of such SA/GPA/WILL transactions (that is generation of black money, growth of land mafia and criminalization of civil disputes) as under:


Recourse to `SA/GPA/WILL' transactions is taken in regard to freehold properties, even when there is no bar or prohibition regarding transfer or conveyance of such property, by the following categories of persons:


(a) Vendors with imperfect title who cannot or do not want to execute registered deeds of conveyance.


(b) Purchasers who want to invest undisclosed wealth/income in immovable properties without any public record of the transactions. The process enables them to hold any number of properties without disclosing them as assets held.


(c) Purchasers who want to avoid the payment of stamp duty and registration charges either deliberately or on wrong advice. Persons who deal in real estate resort to these methods to avoid multiple stamp duties/registration fees so as to increase their profit margin.


Whatever be the intention, the consequences are disturbing and far reaching, adversely affecting the economy, civil society and law and order. Firstly, it enables large scale evasion of income tax, wealth tax, stamp duty and registration fees thereby denying the benefit of such revenue to the government and the public. Secondly, such transactions enable persons with undisclosed wealth/income to invest their black money and also earn profit/income, thereby encouraging circulation of black money and corruption.


This kind of transactions has disastrous collateral effects also. For example, when the market value increases, many vendors (who effected power of attorney sales without registration) are tempted to resell the property taking advantage of the fact that there is no registered instrument or record in any public office thereby cheating the purchaser. When the purchaser under such `power of attorney sales' comes to know about the vendor's action, he invariably tries to take the help of musclemen to `sort out' the issue and protect his rights. On the other hand, real estate mafia many a time purchases properties which are already subject to power of attorney sale and then threaten the previous `Power of Attorney Sale' purchasers from asserting their rights. Either way, such power of attorney sales indirectly lead to growth of real estate mafia and criminalization of real estate transactions.


It also makes title verification and certification of title, which is an integral part of orderly conduct of transactions relating to immovable property, difficult, if not impossible, giving nightmares to bonafide purchasers wanting to own a property with an assurance of good and marketable title.


4. This Court had therefore requested the learned Solicitor General to give suggestions on behalf of Union of India. This Court also directed notice to States of Delhi, Haryana, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh to give their views on the matter. The four states have responded and confirmed that SA/GPA/WILL transfers required to be discouraged as they lead to loss of revenue (stamp duty) and increase in litigations due to defective title. They also referred to some measures taken in that behalf. The measures differ from State to State. In general, the measures are: (i) to amend Registration Act, 1908 by Amendment Act 48 of 2001 with effect from 24.9.2001 requiring documents containing contract to transfer for consideration (agreements of sale etc.) relating to any immoveable property for the purpose of Section 53A of the Act, shall be registered; and (ii) to amend the stamp laws subjecting agreements of sale with delivery of possession and/or irrevocable powers of attorney in favor of non-family members authorizing sale, to the same stamp duty as deed of conveyance. These measures, no doubt, to some extent plugged the loss of revenue by way of stamp duty on account of parties having recourse to SA/GPA/WILL transactions, instead of executing deeds of conveyance. But the other ill-effects continued. Further such transaction which was only prevalent in Delhi and the surrounding areas has started spreading to other States also. Those with ulterior motives either to indulge in black money transactions or land mafia continues to favor such transactions. There are also efforts to thwart the amended provisions by not referring to delivery of possession in the agreement of sale and giving a separate possession receipt or an affidavit confirming delivery of possession and thereby avoiding the registration and stamp duty. The amendments to stamp and registration laws do not address the larger issue of generation of black money and operation of land mafia. The four States and the Union of India are however unanimous those SA/GPA/WILL transactions should be curbed and expressed their willingness to take remedial steps.


5. The State of Haryana has however taken a further positive step by reducing the stamp duty on deeds of conveyance from 12.5% to 5%. A high rate of stamp duty acts as a damper for execution of deeds of conveyance for full value, and encourages SA/GPA/WILL transfers. When parties resort to SA/GPA/WILL transfers, the adverse effect is not only loss of revenue (stamp duty and registration charges) but the greater danger of generation of 'black' money. Reducing the stamp duty on conveyance to realistic levels will encourage public to disclose the maximum sale value and have the sale deeds registered. Though the reduction of the stamp duty, may result in an immediate reduction in the revenue by way of stamp duty, in the long run it will be advantageous for two reasons: (i) parties will be encouraged to execute registered deeds of conveyance/sale deeds without any under valuation, instead of entering into SA/GPA/WILL transactions; and (ii) more and more sale transactions will be done by way of duly registered sale deeds, disclosing the entire sale consideration thereby reducing the generation of black money to a large extent. When high stamp duty is prevalent, there is a tendency to undervalue documents, even where sale deeds are executed. When properties are undervalued, a large part of the sale price changes hand by way of cash thereby generating 'black' money. Even when the state governments take action to prevent undervaluation, it only results in the recovery of deficit stamp duty and registration charges with reference to the market value, but the actual sale consideration remains unaltered. If a property worth ` 5 millions is sold for ` 2 millions, the Undervaluation Rules may enable the state government to initiate proceedings so as to ensure that the deficit stamp duty and registration charges are recovered in respect of the difference of ` 3 millions. But the sale price remains ` 2 millions and the black money of ` 3 millions generated by the undervalued sale transaction, remains undisturbed.


6. In this background, we will examine the validity and legality of SA/GPA/WILL transactions. We have heard learned Mr. Gopal Subramanian, Amicus Curiae and noted the views of the Government of NCT of Delhi, Government of Haryana, Government of Punjab and Government of Uttar Pradesh who have filed their submissions in the form of affidavits.


Relevant Legal Provisions


7. Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 ('Transfer of Property Act' for short) defines 'transfer of property' as under:


5. Transfer of Property defined: In the following sections "transfer of property" means an act by which a living person conveys property, in present or in future, to one or more other living persons, or to himself (or to himself) and one or more other living persons; and "to transfer property" is to perform such act." xxx xxx

Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act defines 'sales' thus:


"Sale" is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid and part-promised.


Sale how made. Such transfer, in the case of tangible immoveable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, or in the case of a reversion or other intangible thing, can be made only by a registered instrument.


In the case of tangible immoveable property of a value less than one hundred rupees, such transfer may be made either by a registered instrument or by delivery of the property.


Delivery of tangible immoveable property takes place when the seller places the buyer, or such person as he directs, in possession of the property.


Contract for sale.-A contract for the sale of immovable property is a contract that a sale of such property shall take place on terms settled between the parties.


It does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property.


Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act defines 'part performance' thus:


Part Performance. - Where any person contracts to transfer for consideration any immoveable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty,


and the transferee has, in part performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof, or the transferee, being already in possession, continues in possession in part performance of the contract and has done some act in furtherance of the contract,


and the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract,


then, notwithstanding that where there is an instrument of transfer, that the transfer has not been completed in the manner prescribed therefore by the law for the time being in force, the transferor or any person claiming under him shall be debarred from enforcing against the transferee and persons claiming under him any right in respect of the property of which the transferee has taken or continued in possession, other than a right expressly provided by the terms of the contract:


Provided that nothing in this section shall affect the rights of a transferee for consideration who has no notice of the contract or of the part performance thereof.


8. We may next refer to the relevant provisions of the Indian Stamp Act, 1999 (Note: Stamp Laws may vary from state to state, though generally the provisions may be similar). Section 27 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 casts upon the party, liable to pay stamp duty, an obligation to set forth in the instrument all facts and circumstances which affect the chargeability of duty on that instrument. Article 23 prescribes stamp duty on 'Conveyance'. In many States appropriate amendments have been made whereby agreements of sale acknowledging delivery of possession or power of Attorney authorizes the attorney to 'sell any immovable property are charged with the same duty as livable on conveyance.


9. Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908 which makes a deed of conveyance compulsorily remittable. We extract below the relevant portions of Section 17.


Section 17 -Documents of which registration is compulsory-(1) The following documents shall be registered, namely:


xxxxx


(b) other non-testamentary instruments which purport or operate to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest, whether vested or contingent, of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, to or in immovable property.


xxxxx


(1A) The documents containing contracts to transfer for consideration, any immovable property for the purpose of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882) shall be registered if they have been executed on or after the commencement of the Registration and Other Related laws (Amendment) Act, 2001 and if such documents are not registered on or after such commencement, then, they shall have no effect for the purposes of the said Section 53A.


Advantages of Registration


10. In the earlier order dated 15.5.2009, the objects and benefits of registration was explained and we extract them for ready reference:


The Registration Act, 1908, was enacted with the intention of providing orderliness, discipline and public notice in regard to transactions relating to immovable property and protection from fraud and forgery of documents of transfer. This is achieved by requiring compulsory registration of certain types of documents and providing for consequences of non-registration.


Section 17 of the Registration Act clearly provides that any document (other than testamentary instruments) which purports or operates to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish whether in present or in future "any right, title or interest" whether vested or contingent of the value of Rs. 100 and upwards to or in immovable property.


Section 49 of the said Act provides that no document required by Section 17 to be registered shall, affect any immovable property comprised therein or received as evidence of any transaction affected such property, unless it has been registered. Registration of a document gives notice to the world that such a document has been executed.


Registration provides safety and security to transactions relating to immovable property, even if the document is lost or destroyed. It gives publicity and public exposure to documents thereby preventing forgeries and frauds in regard to transactions and execution of documents. Registration provides information to people who may deal with a property, as to the nature and extent of the rights which persons may have, affecting that property. In other words, it enables people to find out whether any particular property with which they are concerned, has been subjected to any legal obligation or liability and who is or are the person/s presently having right, title, and interest in the property. It gives solemnity of form and perpetuate documents which are of legal importance or relevance by recording them, where people may see the record and enquire and ascertain what the particulars are and as far as land is concerned what obligations exist with regard to them. It ensures that every person dealing with immovable property can rely with confidence upon the statements contained in the registers (maintained under the said Act) as a full and complete account of all transactions by which the title to the property may be affected and secure extracts/copies duly certified.


Registration of documents makes the process of verification and certification of title easier and simpler. It reduces disputes and litigations to a large extent.


Scope of an Agreement of sale


11. Section 54 of Transfer of Property Act makes it clear that a contract of sale, that is, an agreement of sale does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property. This Court in Narandas Karsondas v. S.A. Kamtam and Anr. MANU/SC/0363/1976 : (1977) 3 SCC 247 observed:


A contract of sale does not of itself create any interest in, or charge on, the property. This is expressly declared in Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. See Rambaran Prosad v. Ram Mohit Hazra MANU/SC/0212/1966 : 19671 SCR 293. The fiduciary character of the personal obligation created by a contract for sale is recognized in Section 3 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, and in Section 91 of the Trusts Act. The personal obligation created by a contract of sale is described in Section 40 of the Transfer of Property Act as an obligation arising out of contract and annexed to the ownership of property, but not amounting to an interest or easement therein.


In India, the word 'transfer' is defined with reference to the word 'convey'. The word 'conveys' in Section 5 of Transfer of Property Act is used in the wider sense of conveying ownership....


that only on execution of conveyance ownership passes from one party to another....

In Rambhau Namdeo Gajre v. Narayan Bapuji Dhotra MANU/SC/0680/2004 : 2004 (8) SCC 614 this Court held:


Protection provided under Section 53A of the Act to the proposed transferee is a shield only against the transferor. It disentitles the transferor from disturbing the possession of the proposed transferee who is put in possession in pursuance to such an agreement. It has nothing to do with the ownership of the proposed transferor who remains full owner of the property till it is legally conveyed by executing a registered sale deed in favor of the transferee. Such a right to protect possession against the proposed vendor cannot be pressed in service against a third party.

It is thus clear that a transfer of immoveable property by way of sale can only be by a deed of conveyance (sale deed). In the absence of a deed of conveyance (duly stamped and registered as required by law), no right, title or interest in an immoveable property can be transferred.


12. Any contract of sale (agreement to sell) which is not a registered deed of conveyance (deed of sale) would fall short of the requirements of Sections 54 and 55 of Transfer of Property Act and will not confer any title nor transfer any interest in an immovable property (except to the limited right granted under Section 53A of Transfer of Property Act). According to Transfer of Property Act, an agreement of sale, whether with possession or without possession, is not a conveyance. Section 54 of Transfer of Property Act enacts that sale of immoveable property can be made only by a registered instrument and an agreement of sale does not create any interest or charge on its subject matter.


Scope of Power of Attorney


13. A power of attorney is not an instrument of transfer in regard to any right, title or interest in an immovable property. The power of attorney is creation of an agency whereby the grantor authorizes the grantee to do the acts specified therein, on behalf of grantor, which when executed will be binding on the grantor as if done by him (see Section 1A and Section 2 of the Powers of Attorney Act, 1882). It is revocable or terminable at any time unless it is made irrevocable in a manner known to law. Even an irrevocable attorney does not have the effect of transferring title to the grantee. In State of Rajasthan v. Basant Nehata MANU/SC/0547/2005 : 2005 (12) SCC 77 this Court held:


A grant of power of attorney is essentially governed by Chapter X of the Contract Act. By reason of a deed of power of attorney, an agent is formally appointed to act for the principal in one transaction or a series of transactions or to manage the affairs of the principal generally conferring necessary authority upon another person. A deed of power of attorney is executed by the principal in favor of the agent. The agent derives a right to use his name and all acts, deeds and things done by him and subject to the limitations contained in the said deed, the same shall be read as if done by the donor. A power of attorney is, as is well known, a document of convenience.


Execution of a power of attorney in terms of the provisions of the Contract Act as also the Powers-of-Attorney Act is valid. A power of attorney, we have noticed hereinbefore, is executed by the donor so as to enable the done to act on his behalf. Except in cases where power of attorney is coupled with interest, it is revocable. The done in exercise of his power under such power of attorney only acts in place of the donor subject of course to the powers granted to him by reason thereof. He cannot use the power of attorney for his own benefit. He acts in a fiduciary capacity. Any act of infidelity or breach of trust is a matter between the donor and the done.


An attorney holder may however execute a deed of conveyance in exercise of the power granted under the power of attorney and convey title on behalf of the grantor.


Scope of Will


14. A will is the testament of the testator. It is a posthumous disposition of the estate of the testator directing distribution of his estate upon his death. It is not a transfer inter vivo. The two essential characteristics of a will are that it is intended to come into effect only after the death of the testator and is revocable at any time during the life time of the testator. It is said that so long as the testator is alive, a will is not be worth the paper on which it is written, as the testator can at any time revoke it. If the testator, who is not married, marries after making the will, by operation of law, the will stands revoked. (see Sections 69 and 70 of Indian Succession Act, 1925). Registration of a will does not make it any more effective.


Conclusion


15. Therefore, a SA/GPA/WILL transaction does not convey any title nor create any interest in an immovable property. The observations by the Delhi High Court, in Asha M. Jain v. Canara Bank MANU/DE/1304/2001 : 94 (2001) DLT 841 that the "concept of power of attorney sales have been recognized as a mode of transaction" when dealing with transactions by way of SA/GPA/WILL are unwarranted and not justified, unintended misleading the general public into thinking that SA/GPA/WILL transactions are some kind of a recognized or accepted mode of transfer and that it can be a valid substitute for a sale deed. Such decisions to the extent they recognize or accept SA/GPA/WILL transactions as concluded transfers, as contrasted from an agreement to transfer, are not good law.


16. We therefore reiterate that immovable property can be legally and lawfully transferred/conveyed only by a registered deed of conveyance. Transactions of the nature of 'GPA sales' or 'SA/GPA/WILL transfers' do not convey title and do not amount to transfer, nor can they be recognized or valid mode of transfer of immoveable property. The courts will not treat such transactions as completed or concluded transfers or as conveyances as they neither convey title nor create any interest in an immovable property. They cannot be recognized as deeds of title, except to the limited extent of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. Such transactions cannot be relied upon or made the basis for mutations in Municipal or Revenue Records. What is stated above will apply not only to deeds of conveyance in regard to freehold property but also to transfer of leasehold property. A lease can be validly transferred only under a registered Assignment of Lease. It is time that an end is put to the pernicious practice of SA/GPA/WILL transactions known as GPA sales.


17. It has been submitted that making declaration that GPA sales and SA/GPA/WILL transfers are not legally valid modes of transfer is likely to create hardship to a large number of persons who have entered into such transactions and they should be given sufficient time to regularize the transactions by obtaining deeds of conveyance. It is also submitted that this decision should be made applicable prospectively to avoid hardship.


18. We have merely drawn attention to and reiterated the well-settled legal position that SA/GPA/WILL transactions are not 'transfers' or 'sales' and that such transactions cannot be treated as completed transfers or conveyances. They can continue to be treated as existing agreement of sale. Nothing prevents affected parties from getting registered Deeds of Conveyance to complete their title. The said 'SA/GPA/WILL transactions' may also be used to obtain specific performance or to defend possession under Section 53A of Transfer of Property Act. If they are entered before this day, they may be relied upon to apply for regularization of allotments/leases by Development Authorities. We make it clear that if the documents relating to 'SA/GPA/WILL transactions' has been accepted acted upon by DDA or other developmental authorities or by the Municipal or revenue authorities to effect mutation, they need not be disturbed, merely on account of this decision.


19. We make it clear that our observations are not intended to in any way affect the validity of sale agreements and powers of attorney executed in genuine transactions. For example, a person may give a power of attorney to his spouse, son, daughter, brother, sister or a relative to manage his affairs or to execute a deed of conveyance. A person may enter into a development agreement with a land developer or builder for developing the land either by forming plots or by constructing apartment buildings and in that behalf execute an agreement of sale and grant a Power of Attorney empowering the developer to execute agreements of sale or conveyances in regard to individual plots of land or undivided shares in the land relating to apartments in favor of prospective purchasers. In several States, the execution of such development agreements and powers of attorney are already regulated by law and subjected to specific stamp duty. Our observations regarding 'SA/GPA/WILL transactions' are not intended to apply to such bonafide/genuine transactions.


20. We place on record our appreciation for the assistance rendered by Mr. Gopal Subramaniun, Senior Counsel, initially as Solicitor General and later as Amicus Curiae.


21. As the issue relating to validity of SA/GPA/WILL has been dealt with by this order, what remains is the consideration of the special leave petition on its merits. List the special leave petition for final disposal.




Sunday, September 27, 2020

Criminal proceedings against husband and not wearing sindhoor tiltes the case in favour of husband.

 



THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT


(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)


Case No. : Review.Pet. 73/2020


SMTI RENU DAS D/O LATE RAKESH CH. DAS,

R/O BORBARI RAILWAY COLONY, P.O. AND P.S. DIBRUGARH, DIST. DIBRUGARH, ASSAM, PIN 786001


VERSUS


SRI BHASKAR DAS S/O LATE HARIPADA DAS, R/O NO. 1 GOLAI GAON, P.S. DIGBOI, P.O. GOLAI, DIST. TINSUKIA, ASSAM, PIN 786171


Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. S R GOGOI


Advocate for the Respondent : MR. N HASAN


BEFORE


HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE

HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SOUMITRA SAIKIA


JUDGMENT & ORDER


Date : 17-09-2020


For the Petitioner: Mr. H. Baruah, Advocate.

For the Respondent: Mr. N. Hasan, Advocate.


Date of Hearing: 17.09.2020

Date of Judgment:17.09.2020


(Soumitra Saikia, J.)


This review application has been brought by Smti. Renu Das for review of judgment dated 19.06.2020 rendered in Matrimonial Appeal No. 20/2019 (Shri Bhaskar Das –Vs- Renu Das).

2. The skeleton of facts necessary for addressing the issue raised by virtue of this review application are that Bhaskar Das, the appellant filed Divorce Case TS(M) No.9/2014 In the Court of District Judge, Dibrugarh, essentially taking the ground of cruelty and desertion against his wife Smti. Renu Das. The suit was dismissed by judgment & decree dated 15.12.2018. Aggrieved thereby, the husband Bhaskar Das filed the matrimonial appeal.

3. Essentially it appears that review is sought on the ground that not wearing or refusal to wear ‘sindoor’ by wife cannot constitute cruelty so as to justify dissolving the marriage. Further it was urged by the learned counsel for the review petitioner that the agreement entered between the parties was at the instance of the family members of both the parties to sort out the misunderstanding between them. The learned counsel for the review petitioner urged that as per the agreement no family members of either the husband or the wife were to visit them. As such, the finding of the judgment in this Court under review, the wife had compelled the husband from performing his statutory duties towards his aged mother under the provisions of the 2007 Act will amount to an error apparent on the face. Since this order is being rendered in a review application, we are not referring to the facts in detail. Suffice it to say that the grounds for allowing the matrimonial appeal, setting aside judgment dated 15.12.2018 (supra) and dissolving the marriage essentially are –

(a) It is the admitted case of the wife that three proceedings of criminal nature had been initiated against the husband and his family members. In Digboi P.S. Case No.159/2013, under Section 498(A) IPC, acquittal had been recorded by a court of law. It thus stood established in law and facts that the wife indulged in making irresponsible and false accusations against her husband and his family members. This justified dissolution of marriage and grant of divorce in terms of judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Rani Narasimha Sastri –Vs- Rani Suneela Rani, (2019) SCC Online SC 1595.

(b) The relations between the wife and the husband had become so strained that written agreement was executed with a stipulation that the husband Bhaskar Das shall maintain his wife the review applicant Smti. Renu Das in a separate rented accommodation where family members of the husband shall not be allowed to come.

Depriving the husband of the company of his family members certainly does not indicate a successful marriage. Rather, it would be an act of cruelty if the husband is bound by an agreement to not meet his family members. Rather, the wife Smti. Renu Das went to the extent of initiating criminal proceedings vide Digboi P.S. Case No.230/2013, under Sections 471/420 IPC for non-compliance of conditions incorporated in the agreement. At the point in time when the appeal was decided the proceeding was still pending.

(c) The Court also took judicial notice of the fact that the wife Smt. Renu Das in the witness box on oath stated "That I am not wearing/putting sindoor right now because I don’t consider him as my husband”. This portion of the statement/cross-examination and other important portions of the statement given by the wife on oath have been extracted in para 12 of the judgment under review. From the said portions, this Court concluded that in the given circumstance when the wife states that she is not wearing ‘sindoor’ because she does not consider Bhaskar Das as her husband, the marriage was irrevocably broken. Surely, if the wife takes a plea on oath that she is not wearing ‘sindoor’ because she does not consider the husband as her husband, it does not indicate a surviving and a happy marriage. Such stand of the wife would hurt the husband’s feelings to a great extent. By making such a statement, the wife has repudiated the marriage. In such circumstances, it would be inequitable for a court to force the husband to live with the wife. It would be considered as an incident of cruelty, however might not be sufficient in itself, and in isolation as a ground of cruelty for grant of divorce.

The circumstances can be considered differently if the wife never wore ‘sindoor'. In such circumstances, the husband would not be justified in pleading not wearing ‘sindoor’ as an incident of cruelty. In this case, however the circumstances appear to be different. On considering the evidence cumulatively and on plain reading of the statement given by the wife, it appears that the wife earlier used to wear ‘sindoor’ however when she stopped considering him as her husband, she stopped wearing ‘sindoor’. Surely, when the facts and circumstances and evidences are considered collectively, such statement given by the wife can also be considered for concluding that the marriage had irrevocably broken. It is in this sense that the evidence has been read.

It appears that the review applicant is reading the statement in regard to the wife not wearing ‘sindoor’ out of context. The review application has been argued as if this was the only ground considered by the Court for dissolving the marriage, however as explained herein above it is not so. The Court has essentially relied on the circumstance of cruelty caused by initiating false criminal proceedings. The Court has relied on judgment rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Rani Narasimha Sastri’s case (supra). The other facts and circumstances, as mentioned in the judgment under review, convinced the Court that the marriage was irrevocably broken on account of various acts done by the wife. Learned counsel for the review petitioner, in reference to the facts and circumstances emanating from the evidence available on record, admits that there was no matrimonial harmony left between the husband and wife, and the matrimonial relations had fractured.

4. We having again carefully gone through the judgment under review in the context of the evidences available on record, are of the view that the husband was treated with cruelty which justifies dissolution of marriage by grant of divorce. The judgment does not call for review.

Review application is accordingly dismissed.


JUDGE


CHIEF JUSTICE

Friday, September 25, 2020

How to evict a person who has come into possession of the property and is regarded as a tresspasser.

 

               IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                    
                 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                CIVIL APPEAL NO. _________OF 2009

                [Arising out of Special Leave Petition 
                   (Civil) No. 10194 of 2007]

BISWANATH AGARWALLA                                 ... APPELLANT

                                 Versus

SABITRI BERA & ORS.                                ... RESPONDENTS

                                 WITH
                CIVIL APPEAL NO. _________OF 2009

              [Arising out of Special Leave Petition
                   (Civil) No. 15058 of 2007]
 
BISHWANATH AGARWALLA                                ... APPELLANT

                                 Versus

SABITRI BERA & ORS.                                ... RESPONDENTS




                            JUDGMENT

S.B. SINHA, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. Whether a Civil Court can pass a decree on the ground that the defendant is a trespasser in a simple suit for eviction is the question involved in this appeal.

It arises out of a judgment and order dated 17th August, 2006 passed by a learned single judge of the Calcutta High Court in C.O.A. No. 253 of 2006 in RVW No. 2671 of 1996.

3. The suit premises is a shop situate in a small town commonly known as Raghunathpur in the district of Purulia. Appellant herein is said to have entered into possession of the suit premises in the year 1970. Originally, he claimed to have come into possession in the said premises pursuant to or in furtherance of an agreement for sale entered into on or about 18th March, 1970 by and between him and S.K. Abdul Wahid Molla, the father of Safiqur Rahaman.

The respondents purchased the suit premises from Safiqur Rahaman on 21st July, 1980 by three registered deeds of sale.

4. Indisputably, the respondent No.1 filed a suit being Title Suit No.88 of 1990 in the Court of Munsif, Raghunathpur, District Purulia (West Bengal) inter alia praying for eviction of the appellant from the suit premises and mesne profit claiming themselves to be the owners and landlords thereof.

He prior to institution of the suit also served a notice upon the appellant in terms of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act asking him to handover peaceful and vacant possession alleging that he had been a tenant therein on a monthly rental of Rs.45/- under his vendor Safiqur Rahaman.

5. Appellant denied and disputed that he had ever been a tenant of Safiqur Rahaman at any point of time. The relationship between them was, thus, denied and disputed.

6. The learned trial judge having regard to the rival pleadings of the parties framed the following issues:

"1) Have the plaintiffs any cause of action to bring this suit?
2) Is the suit maintainable in its present form?
3) Is the suit barred by law of limitation?
4) Is the suit barred by provisions of the S.R. Act?
5) Is the suit barred by the principle of waiver, estoppel and acquiescence?
6) Have the plaintiffs landlord and tenant relationship with the defendant?
7) Have the plaintiffs served valid notice u/s 106 of the T.P.
Act?
8) Have the plaintiffs right, title and interest in the suit property?
9) Are the plaintiffs entitled to get the decree as prayed for?
10) To what other reliefs, if any are the plaintiffs entitled?
The learned trial judge opined:

i. The plaintiffs have proved to be the owner of the suit property having purchased the same from the admitted owner S.K. Abdul Wahid Molla;

ii. The defendant has failed to prove his independent title over the suit property.

iii. The plaintiffs have failed to prove the relationship of landlord and tenant in between the plaintiffs and the defendant

iv. The plaintiffs having failed to prove the tenancy are not entitled to a decree.

7. The respondent No.1 preferred an appeal thereagainst marked as Title Appeal No. 20/1993. By a judgment and order dated 31st May, 1995, the learned Appellate Court held that although the plaintiffs have failed to prove the relationship of landlord and tenant by and between them and the defendant or that the defendant had been let into the tenanted premises on leave and license basis, the plaintiffs - respondents are entitled to a decree for possession on the basis of his general title.

8. The learned First Appellate Court also rejected the appellant's contention that he has acquired title by adverse possession.

It was held:

"It is needless to mention the learned Munsif of the court below in the body of the judgment, at the time of discussion (page 20 begins) issue nos. 6 and 8 on being satisfied by the plaintiffs chain of documents of their title over the suit premises and in such a position, the plaintiffs were entitled to get the decree for recovery of possession as owner of the suit premises and in this regard decision so referred by the learned lawyer of the appellants as reported in AIR 1984 ROC 78 Allahabad page A 35, and other decision so reported in AIR 1984 Allahabad page 66 completely on the flat point of the suit in favour of the plaintiffs and where it has been clearly stated in a suit for eviction by the plaintiffs against the defendant under the relevant provision of Transfer of Property Act where title of the plaintiffs over the suit property being proved and the relationship of landlord and tenant not proved, in spite of the same, the plaintiffs or proving the landlords title are entitled to get recovery of possession of the suit premises from the defendant as owner thereof and what in fact, happened in the given facts and circumstances, out of which this appeal arose.
xxx xxx xxx For the discussion made above and on the existing materials on the case record and when the plaintiffs proved their title and ownership over the suit premises by virtue of Ext. 4 series and on the other hand the defendant as per their written statement failed and neglected to discharge his onus on proving his right or permanency in the suit premises as tenant or otherwise, the plaintiffs suit must succeed and the findings of the learned particularly the contents of the issue no. 6 are not at all satisfactory and cannot be sustained in law in the given facts and circumstances of the case and as such the irresistible conclusion from the above discussion is that the judgment and decree so passed by the Ld. Munsif is not tenable in law and the plaintiffs are entitled to get the decree for eviction against the defendants. As a result, the appeal succeed in part on contest. "

9. By reason of the impugned judgment, the High Court dismissed the Second Appeal preferred by the appellant, opining:

"I am sorry to say that such submission on the part of the appellant cannot be accepted. A person can be in possessory right in various ways i.e. licensee/tenant/permissible possession holder/ adverse possession holder/trespasser. But, the onus heavily lies with the tenant to prove in what capacity he is occupying the premises as the landlord is not in a position to claim any recovery of the possession as against him since there is no landlord and tenant relationship. In the instant case, the schedule land under the deed of gift and so-called agreement for sale are different. So far as the execution of Deed of gift is concerned, it has been sufficiently proved. So far as payment of rent is concerned, that has been stated in the cross- examination. The only failure is about the non- disclosure of the rent receipt. But, simply such statement will not develop the case of adverse possessory right of the tenant, which he has claimed now before the second appellate court. Therefore, when he is not claiming to be a tenant at best, he can claim as a licensee of the premises in question whereunder the title of the landlord has already been proved by virtue of the document. Therefore, such licensee is estopped from questioning the title of the landlord as per Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Tenancy is not proved, therefore, he is not a tenant. He is not claiming to be the licensee although he could have, therefore, I cannot compel him to be licensee. The remaining, if any, is permissive occupation, which is as good as license. However, it is well settled that the permissible occupation cannot be regarded as adverse possessory right. Adverse possession is not proved. Therefore, the remaining capacity, if any, is trespasser. It is far to say that a trespasser can challenge the title of the landlord. Under such situation the presumption, which has been drawn by the lower appellate court is an appropriate presumption on that score."

10. A review application filed thereagainst by the appellant has also been dismissed by the High court.

Both the aforementioned orders are in question before us.

11. Mr.V. Prabhakar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant would contend:

i. No substantial questions of law having been formulated by the High Court, a jurisdictional error has been committed by it in passing the impugned judgment.
ii. The relationship of landlord and tenant and/or the licensor and licensee having not been proved, the High Court as also the First Appellate Court committed a serious error in passing the impugned judgment on the premise that the appellant was a trespasser.

12. Mr. R.K. Gupta, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, would support the impugned judgment, contending:

i. Even in a suit for eviction, the plaintiffs would be entitled to obtain a decree for possession relying on or on the basis of his title.
ii. In a suit for eviction, it is for the defendant to show that he has a right to remain on the tenanted premises either as a permanent tenant or otherwise.

13. The plaintiffs served a notice on the defendant under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Such notice evidently was served on the premise that the defendant - appellant was his tenant. He denied and disputed the same. The plaintiff in his plaint disclosed the cause of action for the suit having arisen on and from 1st October, 1990 from which date the monthly tenancy had ceased to exist. The plaintiff prayed for grant of mesne profits at the rate of Rs.3/- for each day for wrongful occupation of the premise as after the termination of tenancy the defendant was to be treated as a trespasser.

14. Paragraph 10 of the plaint reads as under:

"10. That for the purpose of jurisdiction and court fee the value of this suit for prayer (A) is laid at Rs. (sic) For eviction a tentative court fee of Rs.100/- is paid for future mesne profits to a decree."

How much court fee was paid and on what basis has not been disclosed.

The reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs are:

"a) A decree for eviction of the defendant from the schedule premises, be passed against the defendants.
b) A decree for mesne profits in case eviction is allowed, at the rate of Rs.3/- per day from (sic) be passed against the defendants as scheduled in schedule-II and III below and for future mesne profits uptil delivery of possession of suit property at the rate the court is pleased to order for which tentative court fee is paid at present."

15. It is not clear what amount of court fee was paid. Presumably, the court fee was paid of one year's rent that is calculated on the basis of twelve months' rent at the rate of Rs.45/- in terms of Section 7(xi)(cc) of the Court Fees' Act, 1870.

Section 4 of the Court Fees' Act, 1870 reads as under:

"4. Fees on documents filed, etc., in High Courts in their extraordinary jurisdiction;- No document of any of the kinds specified in the First or Second Schedule to this Act annexed, as chargeable with fees, shall be filed, exhibited or recorded in, or shall be received or furnished by, any of the said High Courts in any case coming before such Court in the exercise of its extraordinary original civil jurisdiction; or in the exercise of its extraordinary original criminal jurisdiction;
in their appellate jurisdiction; - or in the exercise of its jurisdiction as regards appeals from the judgments (other than judgments passed in the exercise of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the Court) of one or more Judges of the said Court, or of a division Court;
or in the exercise of its jurisdiction as regards appeals from the Courts subject to its superintendence;
as Courts of reference and revision. - or in the exercise of its jurisdiction as a Court of reference or revision' unless in respect of such document there be paid a fee of an amount not less than that indicated by either of the said Schedules as the proper fee for such document."

For obtaining a decree for recovery of possession, court fees are required to be paid in terms of Section 7(v) of the Court Fees' Act, 1870 i.e., according to the value of the subject matter of the suit.

16. We will have to proceed on the basis that whereas the plaintiff proved his title, the defendant could not. The learned trial judge has held that the defendant could not prove the agreement of sale.

The High Court formulated the following points in the form of question which are as under:

"6. Have the plaintiffs landlord and tenant relationship with the defendant?
7. Have the plaintiffs served valid notice u/s 106 of the T.P. Act."

17. Was, in the aforementioned situation, a suit for recovery of possession maintainable is the question.

The landlord in a given case although may not be able to prove the relationship of landlord and tenant, but in the event he proves his general title, may obtain a decree on the basis thereof. But in a case of this nature, a defendant was entitled to raise a contention that he had acquired an indefeasible title by adverse possession.

In Radha Devi and Ors. v. Ajay Kumar Sinha [1998 (2) BLJR 1061], the Patna High Court accepted that a landlord is entitled to obtain a decree of eviction on the basis of his general title, though he could not prove the relationship of landlord and tenant. It was opined:

"...In other words, where there is relationship of landlord and tenant, order of eviction be passed on the existence of any one of the grounds mentioned in Section 11 of the said Act. It is, therefore, clear that proof of relationship of landlord and tenant gives right to a landlord to get an order of eviction under the provisions of the aforesaid Act..."

In Champa Lal Sharma v. Smt. Sunita Maitra [(1990) 1 BLJR 268], it was held:

"It is also well settled that one such relationship is admitted or established, tenant would be estopped and precluded from challenging the title of the landlord and if he does so, under the general rule, make himself liable for eviction on that ground.
It, therefore, logically follows that a finding of existence of relationship of landlord and tenant is a sine qua non for passing a decree for eviction against a tenant except in a case, as mentioned hereinbefore the plaintiff on payment of ad valorem Court fee may obtain a decree for eviction on the basis of his general title.
*** *** *** It is, therefore, evident that the court has to ultimately decide the question as to whether the plaintiff in case his title is in dispute, would be entitled to withdraw the rent so deposited by the tenant or not. It, therefore, makes the position, in my opinion, absolutely clear that before the said question is decided finally so as to enable the court to come to a decision whether the plaintiff landlord is entitled to a decree for eviction or not must come to the finding that there exists a relationship of landlord and tenant by and between the plaintiff and the defendant, if such an issue is raised. In absence of any such finding the court will have no jurisdiction to pass a decree of eviction as against the defendant in such a suit."

[See also Deepak Kumar Verma and Ors. v. Ram Swarup Singh 1992 (1) BLJR 102] A defendant as is well known may raise inconsistent pleas so long they are not mutually destructive.

In Gautam Sarup v. Leela Jetly and Ors. [(2008) 7 SCC 85], this Court held:

"22. What, therefore, emerges from the discussions made hereinbefore is that a categorical admission cannot be resiled from but, in a given case, it may be explained or clarified. Offering explanation in regard to an admission or explaining away the same, however, would depend upon the nature and character thereof. It may be that a defendant is entitled to take an alternative plea. Such alternative pleas, however, cannot be mutually destructive of each other."

An issue as to whether the defendant was a trespasser or not, thus, was required to be framed.

18. Mr. Gupta, however, would rely upon a decision of this Court in Bhagwati Prasad v. Shri Chandramaul [(1966) 2 SCR 286]. Gajendragadkar, C.J. therein was dealing with the rules of pleadings. It was opined that although the rules of pleadings should be adhered to; when parties go to the trial knowing fully well the points he is required to meet, the Court may not insist on the strict application thereof, stating:

" When Mr. Setalvad was pressing his point about the prejudice to the defendant and the impropriety of the course adopted by the High Court in confirming the decree for ejectment on the ground of licence, we asked him whether he could suggest to us any other possible plea which the defendant could have taken if a licence was expressly pleaded by the plaintiff in the alternative.

The only answer which Mr. Setalvad made was that in the absence of definite instructions, it would not be possible for him to suggest any such plea. In our opinion, having regard to the pleas taken by the defendant in his written statement in clear and unambiguous language, only two issues could arise between the parties : is the defendant the tenant of the plaintiff, or is he holding the property as the licence subject to the terms specified by the written statement? In effect, the written statement pleaded licence, subject to the condition that the licence was to remain in possession until the amount spent by him was returned by the plaintiff. This latter plea has been rejected, while the admission about the permissive character of the defendant's possession remains. That is how the High Court has looked at the matter and we are unable to see any error of law in the approach by the High Court in dealing with it.

In support of its conclusion that in a case like the present a decree for ejectment can be passed in favour of the plaintiff, though the specific case of tenancy set up by him is not proved, the High Court has relied upon the two of its earlier Full Bench decisions. In Abdul Ghani v. Musammat Babni I.L.R. 25 All. 256 the Allahabad High Court took the view that in a case where the plaintiff asks for the ejectment of the defendant on the ground that the defendant is a tenant of the premises, a decree for ejectment can be passed even though tenancy is not proved, provided it is established that the possession of the defendant is that of a licensee. It is true that in that case, before giving effect to the finding that the defendant was a licensee, the High Court remanded the case, because it appeared to the High Court that that part of the case had not been clearly decided. But once the finding was returned that the defendant was in possession as a licensee, the High Court did not feel any difficulty in confirming the decree for ejectment, even though the plaintiff had originally claimed ejectment on the ground of tenancy and not specifically on the ground of licence. To the same effect is the decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Balmakund v. Dalu I.L.R. 25 All. 498"

(Emphasis supplied).

The said decision itself is an authority for the proposition that it was necessary to bring on record some evidence that the defendant was a licensee and he could not have raised any other alternative plea. It was followed by a learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in Shri Ram & Anr. vs. Smt. Kasturi Devi & Anr. [AIR 1984 Allahabad 66], stating:

"15. Lastly, it was argued for the appellants that there is no relationship of landlord and tenant as between Smt. Kastoori Devi on the one hand and Sri Ram or Satya Pal. on the other. The trial court was of the view that no such relationship has been made out. This finding was, however, reversed by the lower appellate court and not without cogent basis. Sri Ram admits that one Desh Rai was the tenant in this part of the house who vacated. Sri Ram thereafter came in the said portion of the house. In cross-examination, he admitted also that it was agreed between him and Smt Kastoori Devi what would be treated as the rent for the said portion. Further the case of the appellants is that on January 20. 1970, Sri Ram got this portion allotted in his name. All these are pointers in the direction that there was relationship of landlord and tenant and not that Sri Ram has been residing in that portion of the house as licencee of Smt. Kastoori Devi. This apart the suit for eviction brought by Smt. Kastoori Devi against them does not fail even if it is assumed that there was no relationship of landlord or of tenant or that Sri Ram was in the position of a mere licensee. The licence has been determined by registered notice given by Smt. Kastoori Devi already. In the plaint. Smt. Kastoori Devi referred expressly to her title to the house by virtue of the will executed in her favour by the husband. The law is settled that even if Sri Ram was the licensee, Smt. Kastoori Devi can, on the basis of title claim eviction even though she has set up the case that there was the relationship of the landlord and tenant and assumed that the same is not established, vide Bhagwati Pd. v. Chandramaul AIR 1966 SC 735. Abdul Ghani v. Mst. Babni (1903) ILR 25 All 256 (FB) Bal Mukund v. Dalu (1903) ILR 25 All 498 (FB)."
(Emphasis supplied)
19. Mr. Gupta would further rely upon a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Hajee Golam Hossain Ostagar vs. Sheik Abu Bakkar [AIR 1936 Calcutta 351] to contend that the defendant in a suit for ejectment was bound to show that he had a right to remain on a land permanently wherefor the onus would be on him. That case related to a agricultural tenancy. A simple tenancy can be terminated by service of notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Once a valid notice is served, the tenant becomes trespasser.

The situation, however, has undergone a sea change after almost all the States have enacted the premises tenancy Acts governing the conditions of tenancy in respect of house premises. The State of West Bengal has also enacted the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956.

In terms of the 1956 Act, the tenant upon termination of tenancy does not become a trespasser. He becomes a statutory tenant (loosely called).

When, however, a defendant is a trespasser and is sued as such, the situation would be totally different. Plaintiff must file a suit having regard to the cause of action thereof. The Court, in a given case, mould the relief having regard to the provisions of Order VII Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but the said provision cannot be applied in a situation of this nature.

20. We, therefore, are of the opinion that it is not a case where by non framing of an issue as to whether the defendant - appellant was a trespasser or not he was not prejudiced. Had such an issue been framed he could have brought on record evidence to establish that he had the requisite animus possidendi, particularly in view of the fact that it has been held by the courts below that he was not put in possession by the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs in terms of an agreement for sale or otherwise. If he has not been able to prove the agreement, he could have taken the other plea, i.e., he has acquired indefeasible title by adverse possession. He is said to have been in possession of the suit premises for more than twelve years prior to the institution of the suit. The question as to whether he acquired title by adverse possession was a plausible plea. He, in fact, raised the same before the appellate court.

21. Submission before the First Appellate Court by the defendant that he had acquired title by adverse possession was merely argumentative in nature as neither there was a pleading nor there was an issue. The learned trial court had no occasion to go into the said question.

22. We, therefore, are of the opinion that in a case of this nature an issue was required to be framed. Furthermore, the High Court while determining the issues involved in the Second Appeal should have formulated questions of law.

In Dharam Singh vs. Karnail Singh & Ors. [(2008) 9 SCC 759], this Court held:

"6. In response, learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that on considering the memorandum of appeal and the grounds indicated therein, the High Court had allowed the second appeal and, therefore, there was nothing wrong. It is stated that after considering the materials on record, the High Court had recorded its findings that the suit deserves to be dismissed.
xxx xxx xxx
9. A perusal of the impugned judgment passed by the High Court does not show that any substantial question of law has been formulated or that the second appeal was heard on the question, if any, so formulated. That being so, the judgment cannot be maintained.
xxx xxx xxx
15. Under the circumstances, the impugned judgment is set aside, we remit the matter to the High Court so far as it relates to Second Appeal No. 285 of 2000 for disposal in accordance with law. The appeal is disposed of on the aforesaid terms with no order as to costs."

{See also Koppisetty Venkat Ratnam (D) through LRs. v. Pamarti Venkayamma [(2009) 4 SCC 244]}

23. However, we are of the opinion that keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case and as the plaintiffs have filed the suit as far back in the year 1990, the interests of justice should be subserved if we in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India issue the following directions with a view to do complete justice to the parties.

i. The plaintiffs may file an application for grant of leave to amend his plaint so as to enable him to pray for a decree for eviction of the defendant on the ground that he is a trespasser. ii. For the aforementioned purpose, he shall pay the requisite court fee in terms of the provisions of the Court Fees Act. iii. Such an application for grant of leave to amend the plaint as also requisite amount of court fees should be tendered within four weeks from date.

iv. The defendant - appellant would, in such an event, be entitled to file his additional written statement. v. The learned trial judge shall frame an appropriate issue and the parties would be entitled to adduce any other or further evidence on such issue.

vi. All the evidences brought on record by the parties shall, however, be considered by the court for the purposes of disposal of the suit.

vii. The learned trial judge is directed to dispose of the suit as expeditiously as possible and preferably within 3 months from the date of filing of the application by the plaintiffs in terms of the aforementioned direction (i).

24. The appeals are allowed with the aforementioned directions. No costs.

.....................................J. [S.B. Sinha]

.....................................J. [Deepak Verma]



New Delhi;

August 4, 2009